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TAXATION WITHOUT LIQUIDATION:  
RETHINKING “ABILITY TO PAY” 
SERGIO PAREJA* 
 
  This Article proposes a novel way to tax wealth transfers. 
Specifically, it suggests that we divide all assets transferred by gift or bequest 
into two classes—illiquid assets and liquid assets. The recipient should 
include those assets in income but be allowed two options. With respect to 
illiquid assets, the recipient should be able to avoid immediate income 
inclusion if he takes the property with an income-tax basis of zero. With 
respect to liquid assets, the recipient should be allowed a full income-tax 
deduction if he rolls the gift or bequest into a deductible IRA. The 
combination of these simple rules would be much more equitable than our 
current system, and it would prevent people from having to sell illiquid assets 
to pay taxes. 
Introduction ........................................................................................... 842 
  I.   Historical Framework ................................................................ 846 
A.  The 1894 Tax ...................................................................... 847 
B.  The 1913 and 1916 Taxes ................................................... 850 
C.  Back to the Present ............................................................. 852 
 II.   Problems with Estate, Gift, and GST Taxes .............................. 854 
A.  Why Tax Wealth Transfers? ............................................... 854 
B. Analyzing Estate, Gift, and GST Taxes .............................. 857 
1.  Equity ............................................................................ 858 
2.  Efficiency ...................................................................... 861 
3.  Neutrality ...................................................................... 863 
 III.   Alternate Approaches to Taxing Gifts and Inheritances ............ 865 
A.  No Tax ................................................................................ 865 
B.  Death as a Realization Event .............................................. 867 
C.  Accessions Tax ................................................................... 869 
D.  Income Inclusion ................................................................ 869 
E.  Inheritance Tax ................................................................... 870 
F.  Consumption Tax................................................................ 873 
 IV.   My Proposal ............................................................................... 875 
A.  In General ........................................................................... 875 
B.  Cash and Cash Equivalents ................................................. 876 
 
  Associate Professor, The University of New Mexico School of Law; JD, 
Georgetown University Law Center, 1996; BA, The University of California at Berkeley, 
1991; The author wishes to thank James M. Delaney, Joseph M. Dodge, Christian G. 
Fritz, Erik F. Gerding, Nathalie Martin, and Mary Leto Pareja for helpful comments on 
earlier drafts, and Matthew Stafford for research assistance. The opinions expressed in 
this Article are solely those of the author, as are any omissions or errors. 
PAREJA – FINAL 1/28/2009 3:06 PM 
842 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
1.  Spouses and Children .................................................... 877 
2.  Education and Medical Expenses ................................. 881 
3.  Income Averaging v. IRA Rollover .............................. 881 
4.  The Trust Problem ........................................................ 886 
5.  A Crummey Problem ..................................................... 888 
C.  Anything Other than Cash or Cash Equivalents ................. 889 
1.  Stepped-Down-to-Zero Basis ........................................ 889 
2.  Taxing Gain upon Sale .................................................. 891 
3.  Tax-Free Exchanges ...................................................... 892 
4.  Untaxed Gains at Death ................................................ 893 
5.  Potential for Tax Avoidance ......................................... 894 
Conclusion ............................................................................................ 895 
INTRODUCTION 
[T]he most important aspect of great fortunes is not the luxury 
which they engender, nor yet the envy and discontent which 
they excite; it is the tremendous power which they give over 
men, and—it seems—over nations. We may well hesitate about 
depriving a man of what he himself has fought for and won by 
his ability or his luck. But to make his conquest hereditary, to 
put this enormous influence into the hands of a man who may 
be entirely unfitted for it, violates every principle of law and 
policy for which the government stands.
1
 
 
People think our tax system is a mess, and many books propose 
solutions to this purported problem.
2
 Most major proposals either 
permanently repeal all federal wealth-transfer taxes
3
 or retain some form 
 
  1. James M. Morton, Jr., The Theory of Inheritance, 8 HARV. L. REV. 161, 167 
(1894). 
  2. See, e.g., NEAL BOORTZ & JOHN LINDER, THE FAIR TAX BOOK: SAYING 
GOODBYE TO THE INCOME TAX AND THE IRS (2005); STEVE FORBES, FLAT TAX 
REVOLUTION: USING A POSTCARD TO ABOLISH THE IRS (2005); WILLIAM H. GATES, SR. & 
CHUCK COLLINS, WEALTH AND OUR COMMONWEALTH: WHY AMERICA SHOULD TAX 
ACCUMULATED FORTUNES (2003); MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, 100 MILLION UNNECESSARY 
RETURNS: A SIMPLE, FAIR, AND COMPETITIVE TAX PLAN FOR THE UNITED STATES (2008); 
MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: THE FIGHT OVER 
TAXING INHERITED WEALTH (2005); EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT FLAT: HOW TO 
MAKE THE TAX SYSTEM BETTER AND SIMPLER (2002). 
  3. See, e.g., BOORTZ & LINDER, supra note 2, at 75 (arguing that we repeal our 
current federal tax system, including estate and gift taxes, and replace it with a flat-rate 
national sales tax); MCCAFFERY, supra note 2, at 6 (arguing that we repeal our current 
federal tax system, including estate and gift taxes, and replace it with a progressive 
national sales tax). Our current federal wealth-transfer taxes include the estate tax, the 
gift tax, and the generation-skipping-transfer tax. I.R.C. §§ 2001, 2501, 2601 (West 
2008). 
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of wealth-transfer taxation with significant exemption amounts and, 
frequently, special protection for family farms and small businesses.
4
 
This Article takes a different approach. It proposes that we tax wealth 
transfers without any special carve-outs for farms and businesses. 
Instead, we should divide all wealth transfers into the following two asset 
classes: (1) cash or cash equivalents (―liquid assets‖), and (2) everything 
else (―illiquid assets‖). A different method of taxation should apply to 
each of these two asset classes. This approach is simple, it encourages 
savings, and it never would force people to borrow or sell assets to pay 
taxes. 
Our tax system aims to tax people based on their ability to pay.
5
 As 
a society, we believe that it is fairer to make a billionaire pay more taxes 
than a homeless person. As a result, we have not seen any modern 
proposal to charge a head tax on each person regardless of that person‘s 
wealth or income; even flat-tax proposals determine the tax owed based 
on a percentage of the taxpayer‘s income.6 The difficulty lies in 
measuring a person‘s ability to pay. In doing this, should we consider all 
assets available to the taxpayer, such as real estate, or should we consider 
only the person‘s liquid assets, such as cash and publicly-traded 
securities? 
Our current federal income-tax system generally does not 
distinguish between liquid or illiquid assets.
7
 Unless there is a statutory 
exception,
8
 it taxes all accessions to wealth regardless of whether the 
accession is of cash or in-kind assets.
9
 This approach works well with an 
 
  4. See, e.g., GATES & COLLINS, supra note 2, at 77, 139; GRAETZ, supra note 
2, at 160. 
  5. See Joseph M. Dodge, Further Thoughts on Realizing Gains and Losses at 
Death, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1827, 1840 (1994). 
  6. See, e.g., FORBES, supra note 2, at 60. 
  7. See I.R.C. § 61(a) (defining gross income as ―all income from whatever 
source derived‖). Despite this broad rule, our system does occasionally treat different 
types of assets differently. See, e.g., Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404, 412 (1931) (treating 
a sale of stock differently when payment is contingent and deferred); Bedell v. Comm’r, 
30 F.2d 622, 624 (2d Cir. 1929) (treating a conditional promise to pay differently). 
  8. Some exceptions include gifts and inheritances, I.R.C. § 102, the receipt of 
life insurance proceeds, id. § 101, and pre-death appreciation on capital assets. Id. § 102. 
In addition, the taxation of certain accessions to wealth is deferred for administrative 
convenience (the realization requirement) and for policy reasons (contributions to 
retirement plans). See WILLIAM D. POPKIN, FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX 
LAW 52–53, 606–09 (4th ed. 2002). 
  9. See Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955). This modern 
broad view of income was ―another important milestone in a long evolutionary process 
whereby an earlier, narrower view of income has been periodically ‗altered largely as a 
consequence of a change in the Court‘s personnel.‘‖ L. Hart Wright, The Effect of the 
Source of Realized Benefits upon the Supreme Court’s Concept of Taxable Receipts, 8 
STAN. L. REV. 164, 201 (1955–56) (quoting Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130, 140 
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income tax on wages and on business income because the amount of tax 
owed is based upon the amount of wages or business income received, 
which is almost always cash.
10
 Thus, in general, nobody should need to 
borrow or sell assets to pay taxes on wages or business income. 
Gifts and inheritances are different from wage and business income 
because the assets transferred are frequently illiquid. Thus, the heir who 
receives valuable artwork, a home, a farm, or a business may need to sell 
or borrow against the inheritance to pay any taxes that might be owed. 
Most Americans are not affected by this because our tax system excludes 
gifts and inheritances from income for income-tax purposes.
11
 Instead, 
we have a separate wealth-transfer-tax system applicable to gifts and 
bequests that targets the very wealthy.
12
 This separate tax system 
exempts huge sums from these wealth-transfer taxes,
13
 and the system 
contains special provisions for certain illiquid assets, such as farms and 
businesses.
14
 Under this system, the transferor, or her estate, pays the 
transfer tax.
15
 Recipients of assets received by bequest then take those 
assets with an income-tax basis equal to the assets‘ fair market value on 
the decedent‘s date of death (stepped-up basis at death),16 while 
recipients of assets by gift take those assets with the transferor‘s basis 
(carryover basis).
17
 This approach has not worked, in large part because 
opponents of wealth-transfer taxes have succeeded in convincing the 
general public that these taxes are forcing people to liquidate their 
 
(1952) (Black, J., dissenting)); see also Joseph M. Dodge, The Story of Glenshaw Glass: 
Towards a Modern Concept of Gross Income, in TAX STORIES: AN IN-DEPTH LOOK AT 
TEN LEADING FEDERAL INCOME TAX CASES 15 (Paul L. Caron ed., 2002). 
  10. A notable exception is a barter transaction. This generally is taxable even if 
no cash is received. See Irs.gov, Barter Exchanges, http://www.irs.gov/businesses/ 
small/article/0,,id=113437,00.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2008). 
  11. I.R.C. § 102. 
  12. See id. §§ 2001, 2501, 2601. 
  13. The lifetime exemption amount, not including ―annual exclusion gifts‖ of 
$12,000 per donee, currently is $1 million for inter vivos gifts and $3.5 million for 
transfers at death. See id. §§ 2010(c), 2503(b), 2505(a)(1). 
  14. See id. §§ 2032A, 2057, 6166. 
  15. See STEPHANIE WILLBANKS, FEDERAL TAXATION OF WEALTH TRANSFERS 
109–16 (2004). 
  16. I.R.C. § 1014(a). The basis technically is ―stepped up‖ or ―stepped down‖ 
to the assets‘ fair market value on the decedent‘s date of death under § 1014(a)(1) or, if 
the alternate valuation date is used on the decedent‘s estate tax return, the basis is the fair 
market value on the alternate valuation date under § 1014(a)(2).  
  17. Id. § 1015(a). It is also commonly referred to as a transferred basis or a 
substituted basis. If the transferred asset‘s fair market value is lower than basis at the time 
of transfer, the transferee takes the property with a carryover basis for gain purposes and 
a fair market value basis for loss purposes. Id. 
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inheritances.
18
 As a result, we are at the brink of either having no wealth-
transfer taxes or a transfer-tax system that would allow people to inherit 
millions of dollars completely tax free. 
Several scholars have argued that we should abandon estate and gift 
taxes and, instead, tax the recipient by including gifts and inheritances in 
the recipient‘s income19 or by separately taxing the receipt, rather than 
the transfer, of gifts or inheritances.
20
 Other scholars have argued that we 
should treat death like a sale and impose a capital-gains tax on all 
untaxed appreciation at death.
21
 None of the approaches addresses the 
liquidity issue in a way that will change the public perception of forced 
sales to pay taxes. 
This Article proposes that we directly address this public perception 
issue. We can do this by treating all accessions to wealth, whether earned 
or inherited, similarly while also recognizing the unique liquidity issues 
that occur with gifts and inheritances. Specifically, this Article proposes 
that (1) the current wealth-transfer taxes, which include the federal estate 
and gift taxes and the generation-skipping-transfer tax (―GST tax‖), 
should be repealed permanently;
22
 and (2) exclusions of gratuitous 
receipts and life-insurance proceeds from income
23
 should also be 
repealed. These income exclusions should be replaced with a provision 
that allows the transferee to exclude the receipt of illiquid assets from 
 
  18. Advocates of our current wealth transfer-tax system have failed to persuade 
the public that it is a system worth keeping. The success of the estate-tax repeal 
movement, which has achieved a large exemption amount and a one year repeal of the 
estate tax, is evidence of this failure. GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 32–33, 41–43. 
  19. See, e.g., Joseph M. Dodge, Beyond Estate and Gift Tax Reform: Including 
Gifts and Bequests in Income, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1177 (1978); Charles O. Galvin, Taxing 
Gains at Death: A Further Comment, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1525 (1993); Charles O. Galvin, 
To Bury the Estate Tax, Not to Praise It, 52 TAX NOTES 1413 (1991); Marjorie E. 
Kornhauser, The Constitutional Meaning of Income and the Income Taxation of Gifts, 25 
CONN. L. REV. 1 (1992); John K. McNulty, A Transfer Tax Alternative: Inclusion under 
the Income Tax, 4 TAX NOTES 24 (1976). 
  20. See, e.g., Lily Batchelder, Taxing Privilege More Effectively: Replacing the 
Estate Tax with an Inheritance Tax (N.Y.U. Law & Econ. Working Papers, Working 
Paper No. 100, 2007), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi? 
article=1104&context=nyu/lewp. 
  21. See, e.g., Joseph M. Dodge, A Deemed Realization Approach Is Superior to 
Carryover Basis (and Avoids Most of the Problems of the Estate and Gift Tax), 54 TAX L. 
REV. 421 (2001). In this article, Professor Dodge provides for the possibility of a limited 
exception to the general realization-at-death rule for certain illiquid assets, such as family 
farms and small-business interests. These assets would receive a carryover basis. See 
infra text accompanying note 154. 
  22. Currently, the Federal Estate Tax and GST Tax are repealed for one year—
2010. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 
§ 501, 115 Stat. 39, 69. The Federal Gift Tax is not repealed. Id. A discussion of the 
details of the GST Tax is beyond the scope of this Article. 
  23. I.R.C. §§ 101(a), 102(a) (West 2008). 
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income. If the transferee does this, the stepped-up basis at death
24
 and the 
carryover basis for gifts
25
 should be replaced with a stepped-down-to-
zero basis for gifts and bequests of these excluded illiquid assets. Finally, 
the recipient of liquid assets should be allowed an income-tax deduction 
for any portion of the gift or inheritance that he transfers to a deductible 
IRA.
26
 The combination of these relatively simple rules would create a 
fair and simple wealth-transfer-tax system that would not force anybody 
to borrow or sell assets to pay taxes. 
This Article is divided into five parts. Part I provides the historical 
framework that led to our current tax system. This history helps to 
explain why and how we should tax wealth transfers. Part II discusses 
the problems with our current wealth-transfer taxes. Part III discusses the 
variety of approaches, real and proposed, that now exist for taxing wealth 
transfers. Part IV discusses my proposal in detail. Part V concludes that 
the adoption of this proposal would result in a more equitable and simple 
system of wealth-transfer taxation. 
I. HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK 
Professor Michael Graetz of Yale has proposed an insightful and 
creative reformation of our current tax system that he calls the 
―Competitive Tax Plan.‖27 At its most basic level, he proposes that we 
enact a federal value-added tax (VAT) and exempt families earning 
$100,000 or less in annual income from the income tax.
28
 My proposal 
 
  24. See supra note 16. 
  25. There is also a limited carryover basis for assets transferred at death during 
the year 2010. See I.R.C. §§ 1014(f), 1022. This too should be repealed. See infra Part 
IV.C.1. 
  26. See infra Part IV.B.3. More specifically, the limitation on amounts that may 
be put into a deductible IRA in a given year should be increased by the amount of 
inheritance or gift included in the recipient‘s income in that year. Currently, the limitation 
on the amount that may be transferred to a deductible IRA each year is $5,000, with some 
exceptions and special rules. I.R.C. § 219(b)(5).  
  27. See GRAETZ, supra note 2, at 4. Although the most recent and complete 
statement of this proposal can be found in the cited book, this book was based on the 
following earlier essay, Michael J. Graetz, 100 Million Unnecessary Returns: A Fresh 
Start for the U.S. Tax System, 112 YALE L.J. 261 (2002). That essay was adapted largely 
from another Graetz book, MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, THE U.S. INCOME TAX: WHAT IT IS, HOW 
IT GOT THAT WAY, AND WHERE WE GO FROM HERE (1999), and the Erwin N. Griswold 
Lecture delivered to the American College of Tax Counsel in New Orleans, Louisiana on 
January 19, 2002. Graetz, 112 YALE L.J. 261, 261 n.†. 
  28. GRAETZ, supra note 2, at 83. More specifically, the Competitive Tax Plan 
proposes that Congress do the following: (1) enact a 10–14 percent VAT on a broad base 
of goods and services; (2) exempt all businesses with revenue of less than $100,000 per 
year from collecting this tax; (3) eliminate the income tax and income-tax-return filing 
requirements for families earning less than $100,000 per year and for individuals earning 
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ideally should be enacted in connection with a plan such as this because 
it would reduce the number of people directly affected by the proposal to 
a very small percentage of our population. Reducing the impact of this 
proposal is probably necessary to make it politically palatable. Graetz 
promotes his plan as an effort to return to the original purpose of the 
income tax.
29
 A look at the history of our tax system uncovers our core 
tax-law values and provides insight into potentially better systems. 
A. The 1894 Tax 
Excise taxes and tariffs on imported goods, which were our main 
form of federal taxation at the founding of our country, were effectively 
consumption taxes.
30
 Excise taxes and tariffs on luxurious imported 
items would have been paid by those with the greatest ability to pay.
31
 As 
Thomas Jefferson wrote in 1790: 
[T]he collection of taxes . . . has been as yet only by duties on 
consumption. As these fall principally on the rich, it is a 
general desire to make them contribute the whole money we 
want, if possible. And we have a hope that they will furnish 
enough for the expenses of government and the interest of our 
whole public debt, foreign and domestic.
32
 
In addition, because people generally would have purchased these 
luxury items only if they had the cash to buy them, liquidity to pay taxes 
 
less than $50,000 per year; (4) lower the income-tax rate to a rate of 20–25 percent; (5) 
eliminate most deductions other than incentives for home ownership, charitable 
contributions, large medical expenses, and employer-sponsored retirement and health 
plans; (6) reduce the federal corporate income-tax rate to 15–20 percent; (7) do not make 
any changes to payroll taxes; (8) retain the federal estate and gift taxes, but increase the 
exemption amounts and provide special relief for family farms and small businesses; (9) 
either provide payroll-tax adjustments or a ―smart card‖ to low-income people to avoid 
increasing taxes on them with the VAT; and (10) encourage states to do the same as the 
federal government. Id. passim. The exemption amounts of $50,000 and $100,000 would 
be adjusted for inflation. Id. at 107. 
  29. Id. at 87. 
  30. See id. at 64, 85. It is worth noting that individual states had different forms 
of taxation, including property taxes, that were not consumption taxes. The focus of this 
Article, however, is on our federal tax system. 
  31. This is by virtue of the fact that luxury items by their very nature can be 
afforded only by those who can afford such luxuries. Excise taxes, such as the infamous 
―Whiskey Tax,‖ occasionally affected the nonrich. See Act of March 3, 1791, ch. 15, 1 
Stat. 199. It is worth noting that the extensive use of whiskey as currency in rural 
Pennsylvania meant that a federal excise tax on whiskey effectively served as an income 
tax in these areas. See WILLIAM HOGELAND, THE WHISKEY REBELLION 64–70 (2006). 
  32. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Comte de Moustier (December 3, 1790) in 
18 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 119 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1971). 
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would not have been a problem. By the 1860s, however, the government 
needed additional revenue to fight the Civil War, and it decided to seek it 
with an income tax and an inheritance tax.
33
 These taxes, too, were 
focused on the wealthy, but they had the limited purpose of funding the 
war effort.
34
 Not long after the war ended, these taxes were repealed.
35
 
By 1890, it was apparent that wealthy industrialists did not spend all 
their wealth and were accumulating money tax free.
36
 As the 
government‘s revenue needs increased, Congress, in 1890, merely 
expanded tariffs to reach more nonluxury items, thus affecting average 
Americans.
37
 Specifically, these new import duties were levied on many 
―raw materials used by ordinary people . . . [including] wool, twine, 
barbed wire, iron fence posts, salt, and lumber.‖38 Because these new 
taxes were imposed on nonluxury items, those with less ability to pay 
would have been forced to pay out a much greater percentage of their 
income and overall wealth to taxes than those who did not need to spend 
everything they made.
39
 The enactment of an income tax was a deliberate 
effort to shift the bulk of the tax burden back to the wealthiest sector of 
our society by taxing unspent income of the wealthy while reducing 
tariffs on nonluxury items.
40
 It was intended ―to fund a reduction in 
tariffs and to counterbalance the effect of those taxes on consumption 
with a tax more closely linked to people‘s ability to pay.‖41 As Senator 
John K. Shield said in 1913, 
It is a part of the history of this country that much of the 
personal property owned by everyone, and the great 
accumulations of wealth in the hands of the few, had for years 
 
  33. See Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 169, 14 Stat. 471, 478, 480; Act of July 4, 
1864, res. 77, 13 Stat. 417; Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, 13 Stat. 223, 281, 283; Act of 
July 1, 1862, ch. 119, 12 Stat. 473, 474; Act of August 5, 1861, ch. 45, 12 Stat. 292. 
  34. See WILLBANKS, supra note 15, at 4; see also RANDOLPH E. PAUL, 
TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 22–29 (1954). 
  35. Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 255, 16 Stat. 256. 
  36. MICHAEL KAZIN, A GODLY HERO: THE LIFE OF WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN 
32 (2006). 
  37. See Wilson-Gorman Tariff Act, ch. 349, 28 Stat. 509, 551 (1894); 
McKinley Tariff Act, ch. 1244, 26 Stat. 567, 617 (1890). 
  38. KAZIN, supra note 36, at 32. 
  39. For a fascinating history of this movement, as well as the prominent role of 
William Jennings Bryan in it, see id. at 51–222. 
  40. See GRAETZ, supra note 2, at 85. 
  41. Id. (emphasis added). Somewhat weakening Professor Graetz‘s assertion 
that the income tax was meant to supplement the foundational consumption tax (i.e., 
tariffs on imported goods), Professor Kazin notes that William Jennings Bryan, the 
drafter of this tax act, ―would have preferred a graduated income tax that would replace 
the tariff entirely.‖ KAZIN, supra note 36, at 51. 
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escaped taxation. They could not be taxed directly without 
apportionment, which was not deemed advisable. The income 
tax law of 1894 was enacted to remedy this injustice and to 
make this property bear its just proportion of the expenses of 
Government.
42
 
The income tax thus was designed as a targeted, supplemental
43
 tax on 
the unspent income of the wealthy as a way to return to a tax system 
based on ability to pay. 
The 1894 income tax
44
 was simple enough. The tax targeted the 
wealthy and would have only affected less than 0.2 percent of the 
population.
45
 It was a flat 2 percent tax on income over $4,000.
46
 Rather 
than provide for a separate tax on inheritances, as was done in 1862–
71,
47
 the 1894 tax took the unusual step of treating gifts and inheritances 
of personal property as income.
48
 It is not entirely clear why this was 
done. Congress could have attempted to reach inheritances with a 
separate tax; perhaps it was viewed as simpler and fairer to group 
inheritances and business- and wage-income together.
49
 The 
congressional record surrounding the 1894 tax act demonstrates that 
congressmen were aware that it was unusual to treat inheritances as 
income rather than to tax them separately: 
Mr. PLATT. I do not think there ought to be included in the 
yearly income which is to be taxed, either the real estate which 
may be received by devise or personal property which is 
received by inheritance or gift. 
Mr. HILL. I am going to make a motion also in regard to that 
provision. 
Mr. PLATT. I do not think it is any part of the yearly income. I 
think it is entirely foreign to the scheme of the bill. I wish to 
state, while I am up, that there is no feature of the English 
 
  42. S. Doc. No. 63-171, at 14 (1913). 
  43. It was supplemental because it was on top of the usual excise taxes and 
tariffs. 
  44. Tariff Act of 1894, ch. 349, 28 Stat. 509. 
  45. See KAZIN, supra note 36, at 51, 61 (explaining that in a nation of seventy 
million people fewer than a hundred thousand Americans earned enough to qualify). 
  46. Id. at 51. 
  47. Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 255, 16 Stat. 256; Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, 12 
Stat. 432, 483. 
  48. Tariff Act of 1894, 28 Stat. at 553. This act was held to be unconstitutional, 
on other grounds, in Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 637 (1895). 
See also Kornhauser, supra note 19, at 13. 
  49. Looking at both types of accessions to wealth certainly gives a more 
accurate picture of the recipient‘s total ability to pay. 
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income tax which is so odious in England as what they call the 
death duties. That is the name which they have given this sort 
of taxation in England. The death duties are very odious, and 
they ought to be odious in this country. They are no part of a 
person‘s real income. 
Mr. CHANDLER. There seems to be no doubt at all that the 
bill adopts an inheritance tax right into the body of it. 
Mr. HILL. And calls it an income tax. 
Mr. CHANDLER. It purports to be an income tax, but it is an 
inheritance tax upon personal property . . . . I think it is a 
fundamental error to undertake to put an inheritance tax into an 
income-tax bill.
50
 
Why did Congress only include inheritances of personal property in 
income and not inheritances of real property? From the congressional 
record, there appeared to be concern that taxing inheritances of real 
estate would be an unconstitutional, unapportioned, direct tax. 
Specifically, Mr. Chandler said, ―I think he is right in maintaining that 
you cannot in the pending bill constitutionally tax an inheritance of real 
estate.‖51 There is little else in the historical record to explain the reason 
for the exclusion of real estate, but liquidity may have been a concern. A 
tax on an inheritance of real estate might force the heir to borrow against 
or sell the land. Whatever the reason, the system designed in 1894 
created few liquidity problems. 
The 1894 tax act ultimately died when it was held to be an 
unconstitutional direct tax that was not apportioned in accordance with 
population.
52
 This ruling ultimately led to the 16th Amendment to the 
Constitution—a change that, beginning in 1913, allowed Congress to 
levy income taxes without apportionment.
53
 
B. The 1913 and 1916 Taxes 
The 1913 tax act, which is the direct precursor of our current tax 
law, did not include gifts and bequests in income.
54
 This tax was 
graduated.
55
 After a $3,000 exemption ($4,000 for a husband and wife 
 
  50. 26 CONG. REC. 6821 (1894). 
  51. Id. But see Scholey v. Rew, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 331, 347 (1875) (noting that 
capitation taxes and taxes on permanent real estate are the only taxes that must be levied 
in proportion to numbers). 
  52. Pollack, 158 U.S. at 637. 
  53. See KAZIN, supra note 36, at 222. 
  54. Revenue Act 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 167. 
  55. See 38 Stat. at 166. 
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filing together),
56
 the tax started at rates ranging from 1 percent up to 6 
percent, at income over $500,000.
57
 In the early years of this tax (1918–
32), only 5.6 percent of the United States population filed income-tax 
returns with a tax due.
58
 This percentage dropped to only 3.7 percent of 
the total U.S. population from 1933–39.59 Thus, this income tax, 
although affecting vastly more people than the 1894 income tax (which 
affected less than 0.2 percent of the population), still affected an 
extremely small percentage of our country‘s population. 
The change in the treatment of gifts and inheritances from 1894–
1913 arose not out of a desire to make gifts and inheritances tax-free 
transfers, but was a push to tax gifts and inheritances at a higher rate than 
wages and business income.
60
 Specifically, U.S. Representative Cordell 
Hull, the floor manager of the bill, stated in 1913 that a tax on gifts and 
inheritances would need to have ―rather highly graduated rates, so that 
this tax would properly be contained in a separate enactment.‖61 As 
further evidence that this was at least one rationale for the change, 
Congress enacted the federal estate tax just three years later, in 1916.
62
 
This tax had much higher rates than the income tax.
63
 
 
  56. 38 Stat. at 168. In addition to the individual and spousal exemption 
amounts, there were deductions for business expenses; interest on debt, state, county, 
school, municipal, and school taxes; actual losses not compensated by insurances; 
worthless debts; and depreciation of business property. 38 Stat. at 167. 
  57. 38 Stat. at 166. 
  58. GRAETZ, supra note 2, at 86. 
  59. Id. 
  60. Another rationale commonly given for the § 102 exclusion of gifts and 
inheritances from income is, as Professor Joseph Dodge has said, because of ―the early 
20th century view that ‗original endowment‘ (a form of ‗capital‘) could not be income 
under an income tax.‖ Dodge, supra note 21, at 431. Dodge also notes that ―[t]he chief 
contemporary political argument against [a provision including gifts and bequests in 
income] was that it would have duplicated state inheritance taxes.‖ Id. at 431 n.44. He 
also notes that ―a proposal by Senator Norris to add an inheritance tax to the 1913 Act 
was defeated.‖ Id.  
  61. 50 CONG. REC. 506 (1913); Wright, supra note 9, at 173–74. 
  62. Act of September 8, 1916, ch. 463, 39 Stat. 756. Another reason for the 
enactment of the federal estate tax three years later was falling revenue from tariffs and 
anticipated revenue needs to fight World War I. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 
110TH CONG., HISTORY, PRESENT LAW, AND ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL WEALTH 
TRANSFER TAX SYSTEM 5 [hereinafter FEDERAL WEALTH TRANSFER TAX SYSTEM], 
available at http://www.house.gov/jct/x-108-07.pdf. The federal gift tax was enacted in 
1924. Id. 
  63. Compare Revenue Act 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 167 with Act of 
September 8, 1916, ch. 463, 39 Stat. 756. The 1916 estate tax effectively exempted the 
first $50,000 of every estate from this tax. See FEDERAL WEALTH TRANSFER TAX SYSTEM, 
supra note 62, at 5. Rates ranged from 1–10 percent (on transferred assets in excess of $5 
million). Id. The following year, to pay for World War I expenses, the top rate was 
increased to 25 percent on transferred assets in excess of $10 million. Id. During this time 
period, the top income-tax rate was 6 percent on incomes in excess of $500,000. Supra 
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The 1916 estate tax was different from the 1913 income tax because 
the tax base used to determine the amount of estate tax would have 
logically consisted of illiquid assets, such as farms, closely-held-business 
interests, tangible personal property, and the family home.
64
 Although 
illiquid assets may increase the recipient‘s overall ability to pay, the 
recipient may need to sell or borrow against the asset to pay taxes. This 
forced sale or loan issue, whether real or perceived, has been a key force 
behind the movement to abolish the estate tax.
65
 
C. Back to the Present 
Professor Graetz‘s Competitive Tax Plan,66 which looks to the past 
for guidance, retains the current federal estate and gift taxes, albeit with 
potentially larger exemption amounts and special rules for family farms 
and small businesses.
67
 Graetz also appears to be open to the possibility 
of finding an alternate method to tax wealth transfers. Specifically, he 
discusses the following: ―alternative ways of taxing large gifts or 
bequests of wealth,‖68 an accessions tax,69 a federal inheritance tax,70 or 
simply including ―large bequests in the recipients‘ income.‖71 These 
possible methods of taxing wealth transfers are discussed in detail later.
72
 
Graetz notes: 
It is feasible under either an accessions tax or an inheritance tax 
to vary the rate of tax depending upon the recipient‘s affinity to 
 
text accompanying notes 56–57. The reasons for choosing an estate tax, which is a 
transferor-focused tax, over an inheritance tax, which focuses on the transferee, included 
(1) a belief that it would raise more revenue, (2) a belief that it would supplement state 
inheritance taxes, (3) the convenience of modeling our wealth-transfer taxes after the 
British system, and (4) the administrative convenience of placing filing burdens on one 
wealthy decedent rather than on many heirs. Batchelder, supra note 20, at 14. 
  64. The family home is an illiquid asset that has unique value in most families. 
See Ann Mumford, Inheritance in Socio-Political Context: The Case for Reviving the 
Sociological Discourse of Inheritance Tax Law, 34 J.L. & SOC‘Y 567, 582–83 (2007). 
  65. See GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 63. 
  66. See supra note 28. 
  67. GRAETZ, supra note 2, at 160. 
  68. Graetz, 100 Million Unnecessary Returns: A Fresh Start for the U.S. Tax 
System, supra note 27, at 267 (emphasis added). It is worth noting that his focus is only 
on taxing large wealth transfers rather than all wealth transfers that might cause the 
recipient to exceed the regular income-exemption amount of his plan (i.e., $50,000 for 
singles and $100,000 for families). 
  69. Id. 
  70. Id. at 268. 
  71. Id. (emphasis added). It is worth noting that the focus again is on large 
wealth transfers. 
  72. See infra Part III. 
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the transferor and to adjust the tax for other family 
circumstances. Neither tax, for example, need be imposed upon 
gifts or bequests of interests in a small business or farm until 
the asset is sold outside the family.
73
 
Graetz subsequently notes that, although an accessions tax or 
inheritance tax 
would fit comfortably in the new tax system proposed here, no 
such separate rate tax is necessary. Much of the progressivity 
of the nation‘s tax system currently supplied by the estate tax 
could be maintained by treating large gifts and bequests as 
income to those families whose $100,000 family allowance 
does not exempt them from income tax. A flat tax of twenty-
five percent would then apply to taxable transfers of large 
amounts of wealth. The size of gifts or bequests required to be 
included in the recipient‘s income should be set at a level that 
maintains at least half the revenue that the estate tax would 
have produced.
74
 
Graetz does not specify what he means by ―large‖ amounts of 
wealth being subject to the tax. He also does not elaborate on why he 
would use a different rate structure from the general income tax and why 
the gifts and bequests would not be treated like any other income of the 
recipient.
75
 
Currently, about 130 million individual U.S. income-tax returns are 
filed each year
76
 by about 195 million people.
77
 This represents about 65 
percent of our population, a vastly greater percentage of our population 
than would have been affected by the 1894 tax act (0.2 percent) and than 
was affected by the 1913 tax act in its early years (5.6 percent).
78
 Graetz 
 
  73. Graetz, 100 Million Unnecessary Returns: A Fresh Start for the U.S. Tax 
System, supra note 27, at 268. Like many modern proponents of transfer-tax reform, 
Graetz demonstrates a willingness to treat family farms and small businesses as a 
different type of wealth subject to special privileges. 
  74. Id. at 299 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
  75. As Professor Joseph Dodge has noted, income-tax inclusion of gifts and 
inheritances ―does not contemplate a separate rate schedule for gifts and bequests. Such a 
separate schedule would contradict a basic premise of the [income inclusion] proposal: 
that the source of receipts should not affect tax liability.‖ Dodge, supra note 19, at 1190. 
  76. See GRAETZ, supra note 2, at 104–05. 
  77. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. 1304, INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX 
RETURNS 2006, at 40 tbl.1.3, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/06inalcr.pdf. 
  78. One hundred and ninety-five million divided by 305 million. See 
Census.gov, U.S. POPClock Projection, http://www.census.gov/population/www/pop 
clockus.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2008). 
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estimates that his Competitive Tax Plan would reduce the number of 
federal individual income-tax returns filed each year by 100 million (to 
about 30 million).
79
 This would free over 150 million people who 
currently pay income tax from paying any federal income tax at all, 
leaving only about 45 million people to pay federal income tax.
80
 Thus, 
the percentage of people subject to the federal income tax would drop to 
about 15 percent of our population.
81
 While still significantly more than 
the 5.6 percent of 1918 and vastly more than the 0.2 percent of 1894, 15 
percent is much more in line with the original goals of the income tax 
than the 65 percent currently taxed on income. 
This history is important because it reminds us that the focus of all 
taxes in this country is and has been on ability to pay. It also reminds us 
that a consumption tax on nonluxury items, without an additional tax on 
unspent wealth or income, generally will result in an increased 
concentration of wealth in a few hands. Additionally, this history 
reminds us that the first push for a permanent income tax in 1894 treated 
accessions to wealth, whether earned or inherited, equally with one 
significant exception: the receipt of real estate was not taxed.
82
 As 
mentioned, this meant that liquidity rarely would have been an issue. The 
focus of that first income tax, therefore, was to impose a supplemental, 
nonconsumption tax on those with the greatest ability to pay without 
requiring them to borrow or sell illiquid assets. The 1913 and 1916 taxes 
expanded the supplemental-tax category to include an income tax on the 
wealthy and an estate tax on the very wealthy.
83
 The latter of these two 
taxes, along with the later-enacted GST tax, has been targeted directly 
for elimination by some powerful and influential groups.
84
 
II. PROBLEMS WITH ESTATE, GIFT, AND GST TAXES 
A. Why Tax Wealth Transfers? 
The reasons why people support transfer taxes vary. Some common 
reasons include ability to pay, equality of opportunity, and wealth 
redistribution.
85
 The concept of ability to pay in this context has 
 
  79. See GRAETZ, supra note 2, at 104–05. 
  80. See id. at 84. 
  81. Forty-five million divided by 305 million. 
  82.  Tariff Act of 1894, ch. 349, 28 Stat. 509. 
  83.  See Act of September 8, 1916, ch. 463, 39 Stat. 756; Revenue Act 1913, ch. 
16, 38 Stat. 114, 167, 
  84. See generally GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 6–7. 
  85. See, e.g., Anne L. Alstott, Equal Opportunity and Inheritance Taxation, 121 
HARV. L. REV. 469 (2007) (arguing that inheritance taxes help to provide greater equality 
of opportunity); see also Batchelder, supra note 20, at 6 (arguing that an inheritance tax 
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historically referred to the assets available to the recipient of gifts and 
inheritances, regardless whether those assets are liquid or illiquid.
86
 
Equality of opportunity and wealth redistribution are closely related and, 
in the interest of brevity, grouped together as ―wealth redistribution‖ in 
this Article. Of course, wealth-transfer taxes also are a small but 
significant source of federal revenue.
87
 
Public figures who support the estate, gift, and GST tax often seem 
to do so because they value wealth redistribution.
88
 They want to 
minimize great concentrations of wealth, or an inequality of property 
ownership that starts at birth.
89
 This goal has existed since very early in 
our country‘s history. As Thomas Jefferson said in 1785, ―Another 
means of silently lessening the inequality of property is to exempt all 
from taxation below a certain point, and to tax the higher portions of 
property in geometrical progression as they rise.‖90 
The reason to reduce inequality of property varies. Economist Henry 
Simons, for example, stated that there is something inherently ―unlovely‖ 
about inequality.
91
 Perhaps the strongest argument in support of wealth 
 
would ―mitigate widening economic disparities, promote equality of opportunity, and 
make our tax system better attuned to an individual‘s ability to pay‖). 
  86. See Dodge, supra note 19, at 1188–90. 
  87. Net estate and gift taxes collected from 1999–2007 ranged from a low of 
$21.9 billion to a high of $28.9 billion per year. Compare INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
PUB. 55B, DATA BOOK 2007, at 3 tbl.1 (2008), available at http://www.irs.gov/ 
pub/irs-soi/07databk.pdf, with INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DATA BOOK 1999–2006, 
available at http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/article/0,,id=102174,00.html. 
  88.  See generally GATES & COLLINS, supra note 2. 
  89. Id. People who espouse this view tend to also support progressive income-
tax rates. See Michael J. Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not to Bury It, 93 YALE L.J. 
259, 270–73 (1983). The pros and cons of progressive taxation of income are beyond the 
scope of this Article. Due primarily to the fact that income taxation in this country has 
always included progressive rates, the conclusions assume that, above some exemption 
amount, there always will be at least some degree of progressivity in our income-tax 
system. For the classic article against progressive income taxation, see Walter J. Blum & 
Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 417 
(1952). In the article the authors challenge all arguments for progressivity made in the 
name of equal sacrifice and ability to pay. Id. at 445–86. Instead, they argue that the only 
legitimate, albeit questionable, grounds for progressivity are based on an attempt to 
redistribute wealth. Id. at 465–66. Strong cases for progressive taxation include Martin J. 
McMahon, Jr. & Alice G. Abreu, Winner-Take-All Markets: Easing the Case for 
Progressive Taxation, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 1 (1998), and Lawrence Zelenak & Kemper 
Moreland, Can the Graduated Income Tax Survive Optimal Tax Analysis?, 53 TAX L. 
REV. 51 (1999). 
  90. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (October 28, 1785) in 8 
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 682 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1953). 
  91. HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 18–19 (1938). This is not 
meant to be a comprehensive list of reasons why people support reducing an inequality of 
property. The list of conceivable reasons why people might support this is extensive. For 
example, the rich arguably should pay more taxes because they benefit more from a 
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redistribution as a worthy goal is the notion that concentrated wealth is a 
threat to democracy.
92
 According to Professor Reuven Avi-Yonah of the 
University of Michigan, this is so because (1) great wealth can buy 
political favors, (2) great wealth can finance runs for political office, and 
(3) great wealth ―degrades relationships among people (cultural, social, 
and political) and eventually undermines the sense of community on 
which a democratic polity must rest.‖93 A less obvious reason why some 
wealth redistribution is good is because, as the wealthy Andrew Mellon 
said, ―[It] mitigate[s] radical demands for restructuring the capitalist 
system.‖94 Stated differently, the wealthy benefit from reduced wealth 
disparities because society is less likely to reach a breaking point in 
which most of the upper class‘s wealth is confiscated by masses of poor 
people. 
To summarize, people generally rely on three broad categories of 
reasons to support taxing wealth transfers. First, our society is better, in 
terms of people starting off on relatively equal footing and in terms of 
having a strong democracy, if hereditary wealth disparities are 
minimized (wealth redistribution). Second, our tax system is fairer, and 
thus more likely to be respected, if people with the greatest ability pay 
the greatest share of taxes (ability to pay). Finally, these taxes raise 
revenue, reducing the stress on other revenue sources (revenue raising). 
Since 1916, the federal estate tax has been the primary means by which 
the federal government taxes wealth transfers.
95
 This primary tax has 
been backed up by the later additions of the federal gift tax
96
 and the 
federal generation-skipping-transfer tax.
97
 
 
stable society. In addition, a larger middle class, and therefore less inequality, arguably 
would benefit the economy as a whole. A separate article could conceivably be written on 
the pros and cons of these arguments. 
  92. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Why Tax the Rich? Efficiency, Equity, and 
Progressive Taxation, 111 YALE L.J. 1391, 1412 (2002). Supreme Court Justice Louis 
Brandeis said it best: ―We can have a democratic society or we can have great 
concentrated wealth in the hands of a few. We cannot have both.‖ JEFF GATES, 
DEMOCRACY AT RISK: RESCUING MAIN STREET FROM WALL STREET xxxv (2000). 
  93. Avi-Yonah, supra note 92, at 1412. 
  94. Id. at 1410. 
  95. See WILLBANKS, supra note 15, at 3–7. 
  96. The federal gift tax became effective in 1924, was repealed in 1926, and 
became effective again in 1932. See FEDERAL WEALTH TRANSFER TAX SYSTEM, supra 
note 62, at 5–6. 
  97. The GST was enacted in 1976. See WILLBANKS, supra note 15, at 6. Its 
purpose was to prevent wealthy families from avoiding the estate tax at each generation 
through the clever use of trusts. See Batchelder, supra note 20, at 15. 
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B. Analyzing Estate, Gift, and GST Taxes 
Wealth-transfer taxes have strong opponents with compelling 
reasons for being against wealth-transfer taxes. According to Professor 
Stephen Vasek of the University of Kentucky, common reasons given for 
repeal of transfer taxes include the following: 
(1) to improve the low personal saving rate in the U.S.; (2) to 
perpetuate the basic ―American dream‖ of providing for one‘s 
children and loved ones; (3) to reduce the complexity, 
compliance burdens, and administrative burdens of current tax 
laws; (4) to prevent the destruction of small businesses and 
family farms, and; (5) to end the ―double‖ taxation of income, 
first under the income tax law and then again at death under the 
estate tax law.
98
 
Another reason commonly given is that it is generally undesirable to tax 
capital rather than income or consumption.
99
 
Rather than weighing each of the pro-wealth-transfer-tax arguments 
against the anti-wealth-transfer-tax arguments, it is more practical to 
analyze these taxes against the backdrop of traditional tax-policy 
principles: equity, administrative efficiency, and neutrality.
100
 Often, 
these specific arguments fall within more than one category.
101
 
 
  98. Stephen Vasek, Death Tax Repeal: Alternative Reform Proposals, 92 TAX 
NOTES 955, ¶ 3 (2001). With respect to the incentive to save, see also Michael Boskin, An 
Economist’s Perspective on Estate Taxation, in DEATH, TAXES, AND FAMILY PROPERTY 
56, 62–64 (Edward C. Halbach, Jr. ed., 1977). 
  99. See C. Lowell Harriss, Estate Tax Revision and Capital Needs in the 
1970’s, in READINGS IN DEATH AND GIFT TAX REFORM 51, 51 (Gersham Goldstein ed., 
1971). 
  100. See JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 5 (5th ed. 1987); Joseph T. 
Sneed, The Criteria of Federal Income Tax Policy, 17 STAN. L. REV. 567, 568 (1965). 
The terminology used and the groupings of items in each category sometimes vary, but 
the basic principle is consistent. For a more recent interpretation, see Reuven S. Avi-
Yonah, The Three Goals of Taxation, 60 TAX L. REV. 1, 1 (2006) (identifying efficiency, 
equity, and administrability as the three traditional grounds for evaluating tax policy). 
  101. For example, the taxation of the transfer of small businesses has equity 
implications (i.e., it is unfair to tax somebody who inherits publicly traded stock but not 
tax somebody who inherits stock in a closely held business), but it also has efficiency 
implications (i.e., it does not make sense to charge an exorbitantly high tax on the transfer 
of a business if that tax would result in the destruction of the business and, as a result, a 
greater loss of long-term tax revenue). 
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1. EQUITY 
The concept of horizontal equity requires that similarly-situated 
taxpayers bear similar tax burdens.
102
 The concept of vertical equity 
requires that taxpayers who are not similarly situated bear tax burdens 
relative to their respective abilities to pay.
103
 Ability to pay in this context 
generally does not consider liquidity, despite the fact that liquidity is a 
significant issue in the wealth-transfer-tax context.
104
 
Our current wealth-transfer-tax system generally does not 
distinguish between transfers of cash or in-kind assets, with some special 
exceptions for family farms and small businesses.
105
 This means that a 
recipient of the family home is treated as if she received cash. This rule 
is equitable considering that the beneficiary received something of value, 
but is inequitable considering that the beneficiary may need to quickly 
sell the home in a poor housing market or borrow against it to pay 
taxes.
106
 A beneficiary who inherits cash would not need to do this. As 
Professor Edward McCaffery of the University of Southern California 
has correctly noted, 
 
  102. See John E. Donaldson, The Future of Transfer Taxation: Repeal, 
Restructuring and Refinement, or Replacement, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 539, 545 
(1993); Richard Schmalbeck, Income Averaging After Twenty Years: A Failed 
Experiment in Horizontal Equity, 1984 DUKE L. J. 509, 546. 
  103. See sources cited id. 
  104. Professor Joseph Dodge, who prefers to use the term ethics rather than 
equity, has described the current view of ability to pay as follows: ―The basic idea is that 
individual taxpayers should contribute to a government that performs redistributive and 
public good functions according to their respective abilities to pay. In general, ‗ability to 
pay‘ refers to economic resources under the taxpayer‘s control, whether in cash or in 
kind.‖ Dodge, supra note 5, at 1840. For a discussion of liquidity issues related to wealth 
transfers, see STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG., TAXATION OF WEALTH 
TRANSFERS WITHIN A FAMILY: A DISCUSSION OF SELECTED AREAS FOR POSSIBLE REFORM 
14, [hereinafter TAXATION OF WEALTH TRANSFERS WITHIN A FAMILY], available at 
http://www.house.gov/jct/x-23-08.pdf. 
  105. See I.R.C. §§ 2032A, 2057, 6166 (West 2008); see also TAXATION OF 
WEALTH TRANSFERS WITHIN A FAMILY, supra note 104, at 15. 
  106. Attorney Ronald Aucutt argues that a taxpayer does not have an ability to 
pay with respect to an appreciated asset until the taxpayer voluntarily realizes gain, 
usually by selling the asset. See Ronald D. Aucutt, Further Observations on Transfer Tax 
Restructuring: A Practitioner’s Perspective, 42 TAX LAW. 343, 347 (1989). Professor 
Dodge responds directly to this view by saying,  
  But one can have realization without liquidity (for example, an 
exchange of publicly traded stock for nonpublicly held restricted 
stock) and liquidity without realization (any asset for which a ready 
market exists). Nor does the voluntariness of realizations have 
anything to do with whether the gains should be taxed, because the 
tax system itself (the realization rule) induces people to choose not to 
realize gains.  
  Dodge, supra note 5, at 1840–41 n.66. 
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[A]ll of the problems that led the courts to create the realization 
requirement . . . are also present at death: assets are still hard to 
value, and there may be no cash on hand to pay the tax. It 
seems harsh to expect the bereaved to have to sell their 
inheritance in order to pay a tax on it.
107
 
The modern assault on the estate tax should cause us to rethink this 
concept of ability to pay in the wealth-transfer-tax context. This certainly 
seems necessary from a political standpoint.
108
 
The current transfer-tax system, like many reform proposals, 
attempts to make special rules that are applicable only to family farms 
and small businesses.
109
 The complexity created by these special rules is 
immense, particularly when one considers that those forced to comply 
with these rules generally are small-business owners and farmers, and 
not large corporate accounting departments. Perhaps more importantly, 
special cutouts are not always equitable, for example, when comparing 
the beneficiary who receives publicly traded stock with the beneficiary 
who inherits an equally valuable family business. Both assets may have 
the exact same societal benefit, although the business or farm is treated 
more favorably, ostensibly because it creates jobs and its loss may 
disrupt the community,
110
 but more likely because of what it 
 
  107. MCCAFFERY, supra note 2, at 31. But see TAXATION OF WEALTH TRANSFERS 
WITHIN A FAMILY, supra note 104, at 15 (―The data suggest that many estates that are 
comprised largely of farms or other closely held businesses have enough liquid assets to 
satisfy estate tax liabilities.‖). 
  108. The heart of the argument for estate-tax repeal, which, although largely 
unsubstantiated, has proven to be very persuasive with most Americans, is that the estate 
tax forces heirs to sell assets, such as farms and family businesses, to come up with the 
cash to pay estate taxes. See generally GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 2. No new 
proposal to reform our wealth-transfer-tax system can ignore the political reality that 
people cannot be put into a position in which they might have to sell illiquid assets, 
including tangible personal property, such as art and musical instruments, real estate, and 
family businesses, to pay transfer taxes. These assets are unique because it might take a 
long time to sell them and pressure to sell quickly might greatly reduce the sales price 
below market value, they might have personal significance to the heir, and, in the case of 
businesses and farms, they might create jobs. The potency of this argument will make any 
modern reform effort impossible to enact if it fails to consider the forced-sale issue. 
  109. See supra text accompanying note 105; TAXATION OF WEALTH TRANSFERS 
WITHIN A FAMILY, supra note 104, at 3 (―The principal criticisms have been that the 
provisions are complex and distort taxpayers‘ behavior by encouraging them to hold 
active business assets rather than other assets.‖); id. at 23 (―A second broad criticism of 
sections 2032A, 6166, and 2057 has been that those provisions favor the holding of 
certain assets over other kinds of assets, thereby encouraging planning and distorting 
economic behavior.‖); see also James R. Repetti, Democracy, Taxes, and Wealth, 76 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 825, 868 (2001) (explaining estate-tax provisions applicable to farms and 
small businesses). 
  110. TAXATION OF WEALTH TRANSFERS WITHIN A FAMILY, supra note 104, at 14. 
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symbolizes—freedom and the American way. Symbolic value is a weak 
basis for setting tax policy. 
Our current transfer-tax system determines the amount of tax owed 
based on the size of the transferor‘s estate rather than on the amount that 
each beneficiary receives. Thus, a beneficiary who receives exactly one-
tenth of a $10 million estate
111
 will effectively pay more wealth-transfer 
taxes by receiving a smaller inheritance than somebody who is the sole 
beneficiary of a $1 million estate. This is because the estate tax is 
computed based on the total size of the estate, regardless how the estate 
is divided up.
112
 This is not equitable. This phenomenon has efficiency 
implications as well, which are discussed later. 
As mentioned, a concern raised by opponents of our current 
transfer-tax system is that it is a double tax; that is, the transferor pays 
taxes when she earns the money, and then the transferor is taxed again on 
the same money with transfer taxes when she gives it away.
113
 There is 
some truth to this argument. With respect to the gift tax, this argument 
rings especially true, given that the tax is borne by the transferor.
114
 With 
respect to the estate tax, although occasionally true, the double-tax 
argument is weaker for two key reasons. First, the person bearing the 
estate tax, in reality, is the beneficiary and not the decedent, who is not 
even alive at the time of payment.
115
 Had that beneficiary worked for the 
decedent to earn the same money, say by building a home for the 
decedent, the money would be taxable to the beneficiary even though the 
decedent had already paid taxes on it. This is the norm as long as those 
 
  111. This assumes that estate taxes are apportioned equally among the 
beneficiaries. 
  112. See I.R.C. §§ 2031, 2032, 2051 (West 2008); see also INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERV., U.S. ESTATE (AND GENERATION-SKIPPING TRANSFER) TAX RETURN, FORM 706 
(Rev. Aug. 2008), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f706.pdf (demonstrating 
that the estate tax is computed based on the total size of the estate). For this reason, a 
transferee-focused transfer tax will be far superior to a transferor-focused tax if a primary 
goal is to reduce concentrations of wealth. See Joseph M. Dodge, Comparing a Reformed 
Estate Tax with an Accessions Tax and an Income-Inclusion System, and Abandoning the 
Generation-Skipping Tax, 56 SMU L. REV. 551, 560 (2003); Batchelder, supra note 20, 
at 39–40.  
  113. See supra text accompanying note 98. 
  114. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG., DESCRIPTION AND 
ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE WEALTH TRANSFER TAX SYSTEMS 19, [hereinafter 
ALTERNATIVE WEALTH TRANSFER TAX SYSTEMS], available at www.house.gov/jct/x-22-
08.pdf. This makes it particularly interesting that the gift tax is not repealed under current 
law. An argument could be made that the gift tax is borne, at least in part, by the 
transferee because the donor would have given the money needed for taxes to the 
transferee. Given the tax benefit of holding on to assets until death, especially with the 
potential for estate-tax repeal, it seems unlikely that current donors would think in these 
terms. 
  115. See Dodge, supra note 112, at 556; Batchelder, supra note 20, at 5. 
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two taxpayers are not in the same taxable unit.
116
 Second, in most cases, 
the stepped-up basis at death
117
 minimizes any alleged double taxation 
that might occur.
118
 
To summarize, our current transfer-tax system has severe equity 
problems. First, its efforts to protect family farms and small businesses 
result in unfair treatment of heirs of assets other than farms and 
businesses, such as publicly traded stock. Second, recipients of in-kind 
assets are treated very unfairly compared with recipients of cash because 
they may need to sell or borrow against those illiquid assets, often in 
unfavorable conditions and under time pressure. Third, the focus on the 
transferor‘s estate rather than on the amount each transferee receives is 
inequitable because a person who is the sole beneficiary of a moderately 
sized estate will often pay less tax than each of many beneficiaries of a 
much larger estate. Finally, particularly in the case of gift taxes, the 
transferor may be forced to pay double taxes on money because he 
chooses to give it away rather than spend it. 
2. EFFICIENCY 
Traditionally, efficiency concerns are judged in the following two 
principal ways: (1) indirect costs (i.e., costs to taxpayers for attempting 
to comply with the law), and (2) direct costs (i.e., costs to the 
government for administering the tax law).
119
 Although these concerns 
are directly focused on administrative efficiency, this Article takes a 
broader view of efficiency concerns and also considers the broader 
societal costs of wealth-transfer taxes and failure to achieve a policy 
objective as efficiency issues. Thus, if a tax is specifically enacted with 
the purpose of increasing tax revenue by encouraging people to start 
taxable businesses, and if it fails to encourage people to start businesses, 
it would be an inefficient tax. 
Wealth-transfer taxes currently collect approximately $22–29 billion 
each year,
120
 or 1–1.5 percent of our federal revenue.121 It is hard to know 
 
  116. See Dodge, supra note 19, at 1203–08 (discussing husband and wife as 
taxable unit and analyzing the consequences of including and excluding minor children in 
the taxable unit). 
  117. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
  118. This same benefit does not apply to inter vivos gifts. See supra note 17 and 
accompanying text. 
  119. See Donaldson, supra note 102, at 548; see also Schmalbeck, supra note 
102, at 529–30; Edward Yorio, Equity, Efficiency, and the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 55 
FORDHAM L. REV. 395, 409–29 (1987). 
  120.  See supra note 87. 
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with certainty how efficient estate-tax collection is, but there is 
significant evidence that it is one of our least efficient taxes when 
considering the costs, direct and indirect, that go into each dollar 
collected. Professor Vasek notes that ―the National Federation of 
Independent Business estimated that the government and individuals 
collectively spend some 65 cents for each dollar of estate and gift tax 
collected—that‘s $5–6 billion annually—for enforcement and 
compliance activities.‖122 Professor McCaffery takes an even stronger 
stance on the issue: 
[N]early a century of experience with the estate tax has proven 
it to be a failure. The tax is porous and complex. It might even 
be counterproductive, costing the government money simply to 
have it in place. This is because the tax has a long-term effect 
on the incentives to work and save and because it encourages 
transactions—like complicated life insurance trusts—that cost 
the government income tax revenue. These costs may well 
outweigh the limited benefits of the tax.
123
 
In addition to utilizing various trusts, very wealthy people 
commonly set up entities, such as limited liability companies and family 
limited partnerships, and engage in complex and expensive planning 
solely in an effort to reduce the value of their taxable estates.
124
 
Our current wealth-transfer-tax system also appears to have broad 
societal costs. Although there is no compelling evidence of it, many 
people believe that the estate tax destroys family businesses, causes 
families to sell farms, and causes people to spend rather than save.
125
 
 
  121. See NONNA A. NOTO, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: ESTATE AND GIFT TAX 
REVENUES—PAST AND PROJECTED IN 2008, at 15 tbl.7 (2008), available at 
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts.RL34418_20080319.pdf. 
  122. Vasek, supra note 98, at n.16 (quoting Reducing the Tax Burden: Hearing 
Before the H. Ways and Means Comm., 105th Cong. 92 (1998) (statement of Rep. Jim 
McCrery)). 
  123. MCCAFFERY, supra note 2, at 66; see also Edward J. McCaffery, The 
Uneasy Case for Wealth Transfer Taxation, 104 YALE L.J. 283 (1994) (arguing for the 
abolishment of the estate tax). 
  124. See Joseph M. Dodge, Redoing the Estate and Gift Taxes Along Easy-to-
Value Lines, 43 TAX L. REV. 241, 254–63 (1988); see also infra Part II.B.3; TAXATION OF 
WEALTH TRANSFERS WITHIN A FAMILY, supra note 104, at 33–49. 
  125. See Dodge, supra note 5, at 1840 n.63 (―However, insofar as savings are 
target- or bequest-oriented, it is more logical to presume that the prospect of future death 
taxes would induce a person to save more to achieve the desired after tax result.‖); see 
also TAXATION OF WEALTH TRANSFERS WITHIN A FAMILY, supra note 104, at 24; supra 
text accompanying note 98. 
PAREJA – FINAL 1/28/2009 3:06 PM 
2008:841 Taxation Without Liquidation 863 
Assuming that these allegations are true, even to the smallest degree, it 
would weaken the efficiency rate even further.
126
 
More troubling from an efficiency perspective is the issue of 
whether our wealth-transfer-tax system has had any success at carrying 
out its most significant goal—reducing concentrations of wealth. It 
certainly is not clear that these taxes do anything with respect to wealth 
redistribution other than make people feel like something is being 
done.
127
 Furthermore, the basic design of the system is flawed if this is a 
goal. By basing the tax on the total size of the estate regardless how it is 
divided, our law does not encourage rich individuals to spread out their 
wealth by leaving smaller amounts to a large number of individuals.
128
 A 
tax that would focus on the transferee and the amount received by each 
transferee would be far more efficient in this respect.
129
 
To summarize, our current wealth-transfer-tax system has severe 
efficiency problems. First, the direct costs to the government of trying to 
enforce the tax law are extremely high with respect to the revenue the tax 
generates. Second, the money that people spend to avoid paying this tax 
is extremely high. Third, if it is true that businesses and farms are lost 
and people refrain from saving and investing, this would weaken the 
efficiency of our wealth-transfer-tax system. Finally, it is poorly 
designed to reduce large wealth disparities. 
3. NEUTRALITY 
The concept of tax neutrality suggests that the Internal Revenue 
Code (Code), to the extent possible, should not cause people to alter 
behavior solely for tax reasons unless there is a public-policy reason for 
 
  126. The weakening results from the fact that a loss of a business or farm or 
productive investments would serve to reduce the number of people working and paying 
taxes. 
  127. See EDWARD N. WOLFF, TOP HEAVY: THE INCREASING INEQUALITY OF 
WEALTH IN AMERICA AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT (2d ed. 2002); Joseph E. 
Stiglitz, Notes on Estate Taxes, Redistribution, and the Concept of Balanced Growth 
Path Incidence, 86 J. POL. ECON. 137, 137–50 (1978); see also McCaffery, The Uneasy 
Case for Wealth Transfer Taxation, supra note 123, at 322–24; G.P. Verbit, Do Estate 
and Gift Taxes Affect Wealth Distribution? (pt. 1), 117 TR. & EST. 598 (1978); G.P. 
Verbit, Do Estate and Gift Taxes Affect Wealth Distribution? (pt. 2), 117 TR. & EST. 674 
(1978). For evidence that the estate tax has reduced the net worth of wealthy individuals, 
see Wojciech Kopczuk & Joel Slemrod, The Impact of the Estate Tax on Wealth 
Accumulation and Avoidance Behavior, in RETHINKING ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 299, 
338–39 (William G. Gale et al. eds., 2001).  
  128. See Dodge, supra note 112, at 560–61. It is worth noting that the gift tax 
annual exclusion (currently $12,000) does encourage wealth dispersion. ALTERNATIVE 
WEALTH TRANSFER TAX SYSTEMS, supra note 114, at 17. 
  129. See Batchelder, supra note 20, at 39–40. 
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doing so.
130
 Our current wealth-transfer system fails miserably at this. In 
large part this is because (1) estate- and gift-tax rates are high,
131
 and (2) 
the focus of the tax is on the transferor and the value of the transferor‘s 
estate, rather than on the transferee and the value of the assets received 
by the transferee.
132
 The former creates an incentive to find a way to 
reduce the taxes, and the latter creates a simple means to do it. 
Tax-focused estate planning is not rocket science. As Professor 
McCaffery has said, ―The basics of estate tax avoidance . . . are brutally 
simple: 1) Give early, 2) Give often, and 3) Give in trust.‖133 At the high-
end level, we add to this an effort to reduce the taxable value of assets 
held by the transferor while increasing the asset‘s actual value in the 
hands of the transferee after the tax is imposed.
134
 
In general, a high-end estate plan will consist of one or more of the 
following techniques: a gifting program in which the client makes 
annual-exclusion gifts
135
 to a trust for multiple beneficiaries,
136
 life 
insurance held through an irrevocable trust that will not be included in 
the transferor‘s estate, the use of entities such as family limited 
partnerships to discount the value of assets held by the client,
137
 sales 
 
  130. See Donaldson, supra note 102, at 550–51. 
  131. The top estate and gift tax rate is 45 percent through 2009 and 55 percent 
after 2010. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. 950, INTRODUCTION TO ESTATE AND GIFT 
TAXES 2 (2008), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p950.pdf. In 2010, the one 
year when the estate tax is repealed, the top gift tax rate is 35 percent. Id.; see also 
WILLBANKS, supra note 15, at 107. 
  132. See I.R.C. § 2033 (West 2008). 
  133. MCCAFFERY, supra note 2, at 68. 
  134. See Dodge, supra note 124, at 256. This is simple to do. For example, if 
Dad owns 100 percent of the stock of a closely held business worth $100 million, he can 
transfer 49 percent of the stock to Son in Year One, 49 percent in Year Two, and 2 
percent in Year Three. In each case, the transfer is of a noncontrolling, illiquid interest in 
the business, which may result in a 30–40 percent lack-of-control and lack-of-
marketability discount in the value for gift-tax purposes. This discount could easily result 
in a $20 million tax savings, despite the fact that Son ends up owning 100 percent of the 
business. This is a significant problem of having a transfer-tax system that is focused on 
the transferor and the transfer, rather than the recipient and the receipt. 
  135. These are gifts that do not reduce the lifetime gift tax, estate tax, or 
generation-skipping-transfer-tax exemption amounts. See WILLBANKS, supra note 15, at 
185. The current amount that qualifies is $12,000 per donee per year. I.R.C. § 2503; Rev. 
Proc. 2005-70, 2005-47 I.R.B. 979, 984. 
  136. The gifts generally must be ―present interest‖ gifts. I.R.C. § 2503. The most 
common way to handle this with a gift to a trust is to give each beneficiary a limited 
withdrawal power. See, e.g., Crummey v. Comm’r., 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968) (holding 
that a limited withdrawal power held by a beneficiary of a trust makes the beneficiary‘s 
interest a ―present interest‖). 
  137. See Dodge, supra note 124, at 254–63. 
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transactions to freeze value,
138
 charitable trusts,
139
 and trusts that make 
generation-skipping transfers in a way that avoids the imposition of the 
generation-skipping transfer tax.
140
 If the client is married, the plan will 
also commonly utilize a trust for the spouse that is specially designed to 
qualify for the marital deduction.
141
 Although a certain portion of the 
planning is not tax motivated, there is no question that most of these 
complex arrangements are made for the purpose of minimizing or 
avoiding transfer taxes. This violates the neutrality principle. 
III. ALTERNATE APPROACHES TO TAXING GIFTS AND INHERITANCES 
The prior Part demonstrated that our current estate, gift, and 
generation-skipping-transfer taxes are not an equitable, efficient, or 
neutral way to tax wealth transfers. Does a better alternative exist? If not, 
then we might need to accept our current system, despite its many flaws. 
There are, however, several alternatives. 
A. No Tax 
One way to deal with wealth transfers is to not tax them at all. 
Congress and President George W. Bush took a huge step in this 
direction in 2001 by enacting the Economic Growth and Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA).
142
 One of the most significant 
changes made by this tax cut was the repeal of the federal estate tax for 
the year 2010.
143
 The GST tax is also repealed for that one year.
144
 
Unlike the estate tax and GST tax, the gift tax is not repealed; instead, 
the applicable exclusion amount with respect to gifts is ―permanently‖ 
fixed at $1 million.
145
 
EGTRRA also makes some significant changes to the stepped-up-
basis-at-death
146
 rule during the year 2010. As mentioned, through 2009, 
all assets in a decedent‘s estate generally receive an increase or decrease 
in income-tax basis to the assets‘ fair market value on the decedent‘s date 
 
  138. See id. This also may incorporate statutorily permissible retained interests, 
such as Grantor Retained Annuity Trusts (GRATs) and Grantor Retained Unitrusts 
(GRUTs). See I.R.C. §§ 2702(a)–(b) (authorizing the use of GRATs and GRUTs). 
  139. See Dodge, supra note 124, at 354. 
  140. See id. at 355–60. 
  141. See id. at 345–53. 
  142. Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 1, 115 Stat. 38. 
  143. Id. § 501, 115 Stat. at 69; Id. § 542, 115 Stat. at 76.  
  144. Id. § 501, 115 Stat. at 69. 
  145. Id. § 521, 115 Stat. at 71–72. Nothing is truly permanent in tax law, but 
there has not been a significant push to repeal the gift tax.  
  146. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
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of death.
147
 This unlimited basis step-up simplifies basis tracking for the 
beneficiaries and reduces the effect of alleged double taxation.
148
 In 
2010, the unlimited step-up in basis is repealed when the estate tax is 
repealed.
149
 Instead of an unlimited step-up at death, EGTRRA provides 
that assets passing from the decedent to any person other than to the 
decedent‘s spouse will receive a step-up of up to $1.3 million; assets 
passing to the decedent‘s spouse will receive a step-up of up to $3 
million.
150
 
Another more extreme approach to wealth-transfer taxation, which 
has not yet received serious consideration by Congress, would be to 
repeal the estate, gift, and GST taxes while also fully retaining the 
stepped-up basis at death.
151
 This approach would effectively make 
whole families the taxable unit regardless of the age of its members, with 
tax forgiveness on appreciation at each generation.
152
 Thus, once income 
enters a family it would be free from all future taxes, including on 
appreciation, until it is transferred out of the family. This approach 
would remove any conceivable wealth-transfer-tax reason for having to 
sell a family farm or business upon transfer to heirs. It would also create 
two tax classes of people in our society: those who receive significant 
tax-free inheritances and those who work and pay taxes. 
 
  147. Id. 
  148. According to attorney Steven Akers, ―The general purpose of the stepped-
up basis rule is to avoid double taxation, subjecting the same property to both estate 
taxation and income taxation when the asset is sold after the decedent‘s death.‖ Steve R. 
Akers, Estate Planning under the 2001 Tax Act, in ALI-ABA COURSE STUDY 
MATERIALS, PLANNING TECHNIQUES FOR LARGE ESTATES (Nov. 2001). According to 
Professor Zelenak, ―[The] [s]tepped-up basis at death . . . serves an important 
simplification purpose by avoiding proof of basis problems for small estates . . . .‖ 
Lawrence Zelenak, Taxing Gains at Death, 46 VAND. L. REV. 361, 423 (1993). 
  149. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 
107-16, § 541, 115 Stat. 76. Although this is not necessarily the case, if estate and gift tax 
repeal under EGTRRA is made permanent, the repeal of the unlimited step-up (and step-
down) in basis also presumably would become permanent. 
  150. Id. § 542, 115 Stat. at 76–81. 
  151. In reality, the ―limited‖ step-up of 2010 is not very far off from this 
approach, at least with respect to the stepped-up basis at death. First, the step-up is so 
large that, in the vast majority of cases, people will still have a full stepped-up basis at 
death. Enough deferral rules are in place that taxes could be deferred indefinitely with 
recurring ―limited‖ step-ups at each generation. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1031 (West 2008) 
(allowing for nonrecognition of realized gain if the proceeds of sale are invested in like-
kind property). 
  152. This is a bit of an oversimplification because wealth transfers are not 
always limited to intra-family transfers. A person‘s descendants, however, are commonly 
viewed as the natural objects of his bounty. See Morton, supra note 1, at 167; see also 
Dodge, supra note 19, at 1203–08. 
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B. Death as a Realization Event 
Canada currently has no wealth-transfer tax; instead, it taxes 
accrued gains on all wealth transfers at the time of transfer, effectively 
treating death as a realization event, much like a sale.
153
 Professor Joseph 
Dodge of Florida State University has made a very persuasive argument 
for making death a realization event in the United States as well. 
Specifically, he states that: 
According to optimal taxation theory, death is the ideal time to 
impose a disproportionately heavy tax, since the tax would 
affect economic choices only minimally. Yet the most neutral 
income tax with respect to investments would be one that 
abolished the realization principle entirely and with it the 
preference for capital gains. Thus, as a general proposition, 
unrealized appreciation and depreciation, at least of liquid 
assets and perhaps of all assets, should be incorporated into the 
tax base annually. The deemed-realization rule lies far closer to 
that norm than a carryover basis rule, which would allow 
indefinite deferral of gain . . . . [A] deemed-realization rule 
would have the salutary effect of increasing revenue that can be 
balanced by lower rates in general and/or the elimination of 
preferences for capital gains.
154
 
As Dodge notes in a later article, the deemed-realization approach 
suffers from two problems: (1) there would be a need to value assets at 
death to determine the amount of gain to recognize, and (2) liquidity to 
pay taxes can be an issue.
155
 Dodge‘s later article attributes most of the 
public resistance to wealth-transfer taxation to concern about double 
taxation
156
 rather than concern about liquidity except, perhaps, with 
respect to family farms and small businesses.
157
 As the later article notes: 
 
  153. David G. Duff, The Abolition of Wealth Transfer Taxes: Lessons from 
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, 3 PITT. TAX REV. 71, 85–107 (2005).  
  154. Dodge, supra note 5, at 1840 (citations omitted). 
  155. Dodge, supra note 21, at 446. 
  156. Id. at 429. It seems that the two most common arguments against estate 
taxes are that they are double taxation and that they force people to sell family farms and 
businesses, which is effectively a liquidity concern. There are no conclusive studies that 
demonstrate which is a greater concern to the general public, although Professors 
Michael Graetz and Ian Shapiro have noted that one of the most significant reasons for 
the recent success of estate-tax-repeal proponents is that estate-tax supporters have failed 
to adequately address the issue of forced sales of farms and small business, even though 
there is little evidence that it actually happens. See GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 
32–40; see also TAXATION OF WEALTH TRANSFERS WITHIN A FAMILY, supra note 104, at 
15, 25. This information suggests that actual forced sales of businesses and farms are far 
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 The liquidity demands under a deemed-realization system 
would be significant but would be much reduced relative to the 
liquidity demands under the current estate tax, due to basis and 
loss offsets and substantially lower tax rates. In addition, most 
primary residence deemed-realization gains could be brought 
within the exemption rule of § 121. 
 As under the current estate tax, the liquidity problem for 
estates would be most acute in the case of closely held (that is, 
―family‖) farms and business interests, which also may possess 
a low basis. One approach might be to carry over existing 
estate tax rules that allow for actual-use valuation (of real 
estate). If this is deemed insufficient, a more comprehensive 
solution would be to carve out a carryover-basis exception for 
such assets within the deemed realization system.
158
 
Although I am unaware of any empirical studies on the issue, I 
believe that this downplays the magnitude of the public‘s perception 
regarding forced sales or loans to pay taxes.
159
 If, for example, a person 
were to die owning a few highly appreciated investment properties, the 
heirs would need to either borrow or sell the assets to pay deemed-
realization taxes. Stories such as this would rally the political forces 
against deemed realization despite the theoretical soundness of the 
approach. In addition, specific provisions applicable to family farms and 
businesses contain the same problems that virtually every wealth-
transfer–tax-reform proposal has: (1) they are extraordinarily complex,160 
and (2) they are unfair to people who happen to not be born into farming 
or business families. 
 
less significant in the push for estate-tax repeal than is the public perception that these 
forced sales are occurring. 
  157. Dodge, supra note 21, at 448. 
  158. Id. (citations omitted). 
  159. See GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 32–40. 
  160. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 2032A (West 2008) (allowing business and farm assets to 
be valued at their actual-use value rather than at highest- and best-use value, provided 
that various complex requirements are met); Id. § 2057 (allowing a deduction for 
qualified family-owned-business interests, provided that certain complex requirements 
are met, for decedents dying after December 31, 1997, before January 1, 2004, or after 
December 31, 2010); Id. § 6166 (allowing a deferral of estate taxes with respect to 
closely-held-business interests at below-market interest rate, provided that certain 
complex requirements are satisfied). As should be readily apparent, efforts such as these 
to make special rules for small businesses and farms have created extraordinary 
complexity for small-business owners and farmers. In addition, there are many questions 
that policy makers need to answer and that evade simple but fair answers. For example, 
what is a small business? How many nonfamily members can be owners before it ceases 
to be a family business? Similar issues apply to farms. See TAXATION OF WEALTH 
TRANSFERS WITHIN A FAMILY, supra note 104, at 22–23. 
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C. Accessions Tax 
Although we have never had an accessions tax in this country, it is 
an approach with many benefits. An accessions tax is based on the 
cumulative amount of gifts and bequests received by a particular 
beneficiary during the beneficiary‘s lifetime.161 Three common 
justifications for an accessions tax are (1) inequality of opportunity, (2) 
removing the tax disincentive for gainful employment, and (3) reducing 
concentrations of unearned wealth.
162
 A key benefit of an accessions tax 
over the estate tax is that, like any transferee-focused tax (including an 
income-inclusion system and an inheritance tax), it encourages wealth 
dispersion, thereby helping to reduce concentrations of wealth.
163
 
Despite its benefits, an accessions tax has many problems. First, 
although it attempts to tax windfalls, it usually contains a large 
exemption amount that dilutes any purported benefit of wealth 
redistribution.
164
 Second, it fails to accurately account for and reduce 
wealth concentrations because it does not look at the recipient‘s other 
wealth or income.
165
 Finally, an accessions tax shares some of the same 
problems described by Vasek with respect to the current estate- and gift-
tax system.
166
 Most importantly, whether true or not, people will perceive 
it as a threat to family farms and small businesses. 
D. Income Inclusion 
There have been many proposals over the years, including the 1894 
tax act, to include gifts and inheritances in income.
167
 The rationale for 
this approach is that gifts and inheritances are accessions to wealth and 
thus, under the Haig-Simons definition of income,
168
 should be taxable 
like any other income.
169
 Some advocates of this approach have 
suggested that gifts and inheritances should be taxable to the recipient 
 
  161. See Dodge, supra note 19, at 1178 n.9. See generally Harry J. Rudick, A 
Proposal for an Accessions Tax, 1 TAX L. REV. 25, 32 (1945); Harry J. Rudick, What 
Alternative to the Estate and Gift Taxes?, 38 CAL. L. REV. 150, 167–68 (1950). 
  162. See Dodge, supra note 112, at 560. 
  163. See id. at 561. 
  164. See id. at 558. 
  165. Id. at 562. 
  166. See supra text accompanying note 98. 
  167. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
  168. Under this definition, income is defined as ―the algebraic sum of (1) the 
market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of the 
store of property rights between the beginning and end of the period in question.‖ 
SIMONS, supra note 91, at 50.  
  169. Kornhauser, supra note 19, at 28; see Dodge, supra note 19, at 1183. 
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without any deduction to the transferor.
170
 Others have suggested that a 
deduction should be allowed to the transferor, and the gift or bequest 
should be included in the transferee‘s income.171 Others have advocated 
for our current approach, which does not give the transferor a deduction 
and does not include gifts or bequests in the recipient‘s income.172 
The income-inclusion approach is the most equitable of the 
alternative ways to tax wealth transfers because it treats everybody 
equally. It does, however, have some serious drawbacks. First, it suffers 
from the same liquidity issues as our current system. Thus, the public 
perception that it destroys family farms and businesses would continue. 
Second, because it normally has no special exemption, like the current 
estate tax has, many more people would be affected by it. This makes the 
income-inclusion approach a much harder sell from a political 
standpoint. Third, it raises questions about the taxable unit and how to 
treat support obligations with respect to a spouse and minor children.
173
 
Finally, with our progressive income-tax rates, it raises the problem of 
income bunching because inheritances would tend to bunch a lot of 
income into one year, potentially pushing the recipient into a higher-
than-usual income-tax bracket. Commonly, the proposed solution to this 
last issue is income averaging;
174
 however, income averaging would add 
significant complexity to the system.
175
 
E. Inheritance Tax 
 Inheritance tax is a broad term that some people use as a synonym 
for accessions tax
176
 and that others use to refer to any recipient-focused 
wealth-transfer tax, including both an accessions tax and an income-
inclusion approach.
177
 This view would include the hybrid income-
inclusion and accession-tax system recently proposed by Professor Lily 
Batchelder of New York University.
178
 I use the term inheritance tax to 
refer to any tax based on the amount that a particular beneficiary receives 
as a result of a decedent‘s death or by lifetime gift.179 The biggest 
 
  170. See Kornhauser, supra note 19, at 28. 
  171. See id. at 28–29. 
  172. Id. at 28. 
  173. These issues are addressed very thoroughly by Professor Dodge. See 
Dodge, supra note 19, at 1202–08. 
  174. See id. 11181 & n.21, 1190 & n.64. 
  175. See infra Part IV.B.3. 
  176. ALTERNATIVE WEALTH TRANSFER TAX SYSTEMS, supra note 114, at 7. 
  177. See Batchelder, supra note 20, at 7; see also Dodge, supra note 112, at 562. 
  178. See Batchelder, supra note 20. The idea of combining the two was proposed 
in very general terms by Professor Dodge. See Dodge, supra note 112, at 551. 
  179. See Dodge, supra note 19, at 1178 n.8. 
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problem with most common forms of inheritance taxes is that the tax 
base that is used usually is only based on the inheritance received, and is 
not related to the transferee‘s other income, wealth, or gratuitous 
accessions.
180
 Batchelder‘s hybrid approach attempts to address this 
issue. 
Batchelder proposes that we permanently repeal the estate tax and 
replace it with a system in which gifts and inheritances are included in 
the recipient‘s income and, in addition, subject to a 15 percent accessions 
tax.
181
 Under her hybrid proposal, which she refers to as an inheritance 
tax, each transferee would have a $2.3 million exemption from both the 
income inclusion and the 15 percent tax.
182
 Recipients would take 
inheritances with a carryover basis.
183
 Her proposal is expressly 
―motivated by the view that large gifts and bequests should be taxed to 
mitigate widening economic disparities, promote equality of opportunity, 
and make our tax system better attuned to an individual‘s ability to 
pay.‖184 She believes that an inheritance tax would do a better job than 
our current system at reducing wealth concentrations, in large part 
because a transferee-focused tax would ―reward donors who give more 
broadly.‖185 I agree. 
Like all wealth-transfer-tax proposals, however, Batchelder‘s 
proposal presents problems. First, its effort to utilize a carryover-basis 
regime most likely would not work.
186
 Dodge has identified the 
significant arguments against a carryover basis, and they are worth 
 
  180. Dodge, supra note 112, at 562. 
  181. Batchelder, supra note 20, at 2. 
  182. Id. 
  183. Id. 
  184. Id. at 6. She follows this sentence with the following sentence: ―The estate 
tax does a good job at accomplishing all of these objectives.‖ Id. This conclusion is not 
explained or shown to be supported by data. If the estate tax does a good job at this, we 
should not see widening economic disparities that we need to mitigate. These widening 
disparities in large part have led me to conclude that the estate tax is ineffective at 
accomplishing this goal. A counterargument to this assertion is that wealth inequality in 
this country would be even greater than it currently is without wealth-transfer taxes. See 
GATES & COLLINS, supra note 2, at 24–25. 
  185. Batchelder, supra note 20, at 2. 
  186. As mentioned, we currently are scheduled to have a limited carryover basis 
appear during the one year of estate-tax repeal, although it seems unlikely that that 
regime will last if it ever takes effect. See supra note 25. For counterarguments, see 
Bernard Barnett, The Return of Those Two “Dirty Words”: Carryover Basis, 139 TR. & 
EST. 32 (2000); Krisanne M. Schlachter, Note, Repeal of the Federal Estate & Gift Tax: 
Will It Happen and How Will It Affect Our Progressive Tax System?, 19 VA. TAX REV. 
781, 799 (2000). In 1976, Congress adopted a carryover-basis rule. FEDERAL WEALTH 
TRANSFER TAX SYSTEM, supra note 62, at 7. It, however, was repealed before it went into 
effect due to outcries about the difficulty of tracking basis. Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax 
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-223, § 401, 96 Stat. 229; see FEDERAL WEALTH TRANSFER 
TAX SYSTEM, supra note 62, at 7–8. 
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repeating here.
187
 Specifically, a carryover-basis approach fosters 
horizontal inequity among beneficiaries;
188
 it creates complex fiduciary 
problems in determining which assets, with which built-in gain, to 
distribute;
189
 it opens the potential for mistakes by testators, who might 
not consider built-in gain issues;
190
 it would increase the ―lock-in effect‖ 
compared to the current rule because beneficiaries would seek to 
postpone realization, possibly for generations;
191
 and it would cause 
people to assert that basis cannot be determined.
192
 
Second, Batchelder‘s proposal is complex, which is likely to make it 
politically unpopular. For example, it uses market value to determine the 
amount of inheritance tax owed.
193
 This makes sense from an equity 
perspective, but it creates the potential for double taxation to the same 
beneficiary—first when she inherits an appreciated asset and is taxed on 
that receipt, and then again when she sells it. To resolve the problem, the 
heir is taxed on accrued gain when he or she sells the property but can 
deduct from the capital gain ―the share of her inheritance that the accrued 
gain represented at the time of receipt, multiplied by her inheritance tax 
rate at that time.‖194 The proposal also identifies problems with tracing 
basis for certain assets, like baseball-card collections, and suggests a 
limited stepped-up basis for these assets.
195
 In short, the use of carryover 
basis, although appealing from an equity perspective, has several 
difficulties that ultimately would result in significant complexity. 
Third, the proposal creates the same liquidity problems, particularly 
with respect to family businesses and farms, as our current estate tax. 
Batchelder attempts to minimize this, but the solution is complex, which 
would generate public resistance to the proposal. Specifically, heirs 
would be allowed  
 
  187. Dodge, supra note 21. 
  188. Id. at 440. 
  189. Id. 
  190. Id. 
  191. Id. at 442, 
  192. Id. at 443, 448–50. 
  193. Batchelder, supra note 20, at 21. 
  194. Id. 
  195. Id. This approach of looking to the estate‘s other assets to see if there is 
enough liquidity to pay taxes is problematic because it does not appear to fully appreciate 
the political problems of doing this. As mentioned, under current law, many estates 
consisting of farms and closely held businesses have enough other liquid assets to satisfy 
estate-tax liabilities. See TAXATION OF WEALTH TRANSFERS WITHIN A FAMILY, supra note 
104, at 3, 15, 25. The problem is that heirs of these estates assert that taxes prevent them 
from meeting day-to-day business needs, investing, and expanding the business. Id. at 3, 
15. Regardless whether this is true, the general public will likely believe it to be true, and 
this will generate resistance to her proposal. 
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to choose to defer taxes due on illiquid assets at a market rate 
of interest until disposition, no matter how far in the future. 
This deferral election would only be available to the extent that 
the tax could not be paid with other inherited liquid assets, after 
leaving a reasonable cushion.
196
  
She goes on to note that heirs would need ―to provide the IRS with 
periodic valuations of the illiquid asset(s), and the IRS would have a 
secured interest in the asset.‖197 I like that her proposal treats farms and 
businesses no differently from other illiquid assets,
198
 although I wish she 
would expand her definition of illiquid-assets.
199
 In short, the complexity 
of this provision will create the same political problems that we have 
under the current estate tax. 
Finally, Batchelder focuses on the very wealthy by using a $2.3 
million exemption.
200
 She acknowledges that she does this under the 
assumption that revenue neutrality would be politically necessary.
201
 My 
concern is that an exemption this large does little to help level the 
playing field at birth, and it seems a lot like our current system, which 
has not done much to level the playing field. 
F. Consumption Tax 
As the history of our current tax system demonstrates,
202
 a 
consumption tax without a supplemental income tax or wealth tax fails to 
base the amount of tax owed on ability to pay because wealthy people 
tend to spend a small percentage of their wealth, allowing their wealth to 
compound tax free, while poorer people tend to spend everything they 
have. 
Currently, there are two broad types of consumption taxes that are 
popular. First, we see direct consumption taxes in which the tax is 
 
  196. Batchelder, supra note 20, at 22. 
  197. Id. at 23. 
  198.  Id. 
  199. Specifically, she notes that ―illiquid assets could be defined fairly broadly‖ 
and ―could include closely held businesses, real property held for investment purposes, 
and collectibles.‖ Id. She would not, however, include in the definition of illiquid assets 
―property used in part for personal consumption, because its value will tend to decline as 
it is consumed.‖ Id. (citing Dodge, supra note 19, at 1199). This is a valid point, but it 
aims to increase tax revenue at the expense of a great deal of complexity. This Article‘s 
proposal accepts a relatively small loss of tax revenue in the interest of simplifying our 
tax system. 
  200. Id. at 19. 
  201. Id. She also acknowledges that ―$2.3 million is a lot of money,‖ and that 
―an argument could certainly be made that this exemption is too high.‖ Id. 
  202. See supra Part I. 
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imposed on actual purchases.
203
 This can take the form of retail-sales 
taxes on a tax base that may or may not include services, and that often 
have specific exclusions for basic necessities, including food and 
services such as medical care.
204
 It can also take the form of a VAT, 
which often also has certain exclusions that result in a tax on less than 
the full consumption base.
205
 This type of consumption tax does not need 
to separately consider gifts and inheritances; they are merely taxed if and 
when spent on consumption by the recipient.
206
 
The second common type of consumption tax looks a lot like an 
income tax. This method takes all accessions to wealth in a given year 
and subtracts out assets transferred to savings or investment; what is left 
is deemed to be taxable consumption.
207
 The primary benefit of this type 
of consumption tax is that it allows the tax system to retain a progressive 
rate structure.
208
 Under this type of consumption tax, cash gifts and 
inheritances are generally included in the recipient‘s income, and the 
recipient receives a deduction if the cash is invested in business or 
investment property.
209
 Likewise, if business or investment property is 
received directly by gift or bequest, it is not included in income, and the 
recipient takes the property with a zero basis.
210
 All personal assets that 
are inherited or received by gift or inheritance, including a personal 
residence and tangible personal property, will be included in the 
recipient‘s income with no deduction.211 
The primary problem with all consumption-tax approaches is that 
they return us to a system in which the wealthy have even greater 
 
  203. See BOORTZ & LINDER, supra note 2. 
  204. GRAETZ, supra note 2, at 68. 
  205. Id. A good description of a common credit-method VAT can be found in 
GRAETZ, supra note 2, at 65–66. 
  206. See BOORTZ & LINDER, supra note 2, at 74–75. 
  207. See MCCAFFERY, supra note 2, at 15. Other variations of this idea include 
the ―USA Tax‖ sponsored by Senators Nunn and Domenici, see GRAETZ, supra note 2, at 
76, and Steve Forbes‘s proposed flat tax. See FORBES, supra note 2, at 59–66. 
  208. See MCCAFFERY, supra note 2, at 78–88. 
  209. Dodge, supra note 19, at 1199; see also William D. Andrews, A 
Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113 (1974) 
(explaining how a consumption tax might fit within a structure that resembles an income 
tax). Under this approach, using the cash to buy a personal residence, for example, would 
not allow for a deduction. 
  210. Dodge, supra note 19, at 1199. Thus, if the recipient receives the family 
home, a personal use asset, it will be included in the recipient‘s income with no 
corresponding deduction. 
  211. Id. Dodge notes that a tax deferral for personal assets that are consumed 
(i.e., giving those assets a zero basis and not including the value of the assets in the 
recipient‘s income) would result in what is effectively tax forgiveness. Id. at 1119 n.113. 
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opportunities to amass large amounts of wealth.
212
 In addition, 
consumption taxes generally hurt lower-income people, who obviously 
must spend a greater percentage of their income on consumption. It is 
conceivable under a consumption tax that wealthy families would keep 
property invested and growing for generations. This does nothing to 
reduce wealth concentrations and the problems that come with it.
213
 In 
short, a consumption-tax approach puts us back to where we were before 
the income tax was enacted.
214
 
IV. MY PROPOSAL 
My proposal differs from any of the proposals discussed earlier. It 
shares some elements of the income-inclusion approach and the 
consumption-tax approach, but it cannot accurately be described as a 
hybrid of the two. 
A. In General 
The basic proposal is extremely simple. Essentially, all assets 
transferred by gift or bequest are divided into the following two classes: 
(1) cash or cash equivalents (―liquid assets‖), and (2) everything else 
(―illiquid assets‖). Each class is treated differently. 
With respect to liquid assets, they generally should be included in 
the recipient‘s income in the year of receipt. However, in order to ensure 
that recipients of liquid assets are treated as equitably as possible 
compared to recipients of illiquid assets, the recipient of liquid assets 
should be allowed an income-tax deduction for any portion of the gift or 
inheritance that she transfers to a deductible IRA. This has the added 
benefit of encouraging the recipient to save for retirement by treating her 
like an employee who may contribute wages to a deductible retirement 
plan.
215
 In essence, the recipient may choose to either (1) pay taxes 
currently or (2) defer taxes and subject the assets to the IRA rules. It also 
ensures that these assets will be taxed eventually, either when taken as a 
 
  212. See generally KAZIN, supra note 36, at 32–65 (describing the growing 
concentration of wealth in the hands of a wealthy few under a consumption tax). 
  213. See supra text accompanying notes 102–105. 
  214. See supra Part I.A. 
  215. A distinction, however, is that retirement-plan contributions are subject to 
specific dollar limits on the amount that may be contributed each year while this proposal 
would allow an unlimited contribution and deduction, up to the amount of gift or 
inheritance included in income, for the year of receipt of the gift or inheritance. See, e.g., 
I.R.C. §§ 402(g), 415. 
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required minimum distribution from the IRA, or when distributed as 
Income in Respect of a Decedent (IRD)
216
 after death. 
With respect to illiquid assets, the recipient should have the option 
of either (1) deferring all taxable gain until the asset is sold, if ever, and 
taking the asset with a basis of zero, or (2) including the value of the 
asset in income in the year of receipt and taking the asset with a fair-
market-value basis. With respect to deferring the gain, the basic idea is 
that tax basis is stepped down to zero and taxes will not be owed until the 
asset is sold, at which time the sales proceeds would be fully taxable as 
ordinary income to the seller. If the recipient should choose to include 
the value of the property in income, he would take the property with an 
income-tax basis equal to the property‘s fair market value, and all future 
gain on sale would be capital gain. 
B. Cash and Cash Equivalents 
Cash and cash equivalents differ from all other types of receipts 
because if a tax is owed on the receipt, it is not difficult to obtain money 
to pay taxes. More specifically, no borrowing or lengthy, uncertain sales 
period is required. Assets that fall into this category certainly would 
include cash and publicly traded securities. It might be expanded to 
include other assets, such as gold bullion, if those other assets always 
have a ready market, sales generally occur within twenty-four hours of 
the attempt to sell, and those assets are not tangible personal property, 
such as wedding rings or collectibles, that commonly have sentimental 
value within families. 
A pure income-inclusion approach would require cash and its 
equivalent, as well as other gifts in kind, to be included in the recipient‘s 
income in the year of receipt, with the possible exception of allowing for 
income averaging to reduce the effect of bunching income into higher 
income-tax brackets.
217
 A consumption-tax approach to gifts and 
inheritances would allow the deferral of tax until the money is spent, 
potentially allowing for eternal deferral of taxes on liquid assets.
218
 This 
proposal adopts aspects of both approaches. 
 
  216. I.R.C. § 691 (West 2008). In general, IRD is income that never was taxed to 
the decedent during life and, therefore, is taxed to the recipient of that income as ordinary 
income after the decedent‘s death. 
  217. See Dodge, supra note 19, at 1181 & n.20, 1190 & n.64; see also infra Part 
IV.B.3 for a discussion of income averaging. 
  218. See supra text accompanying notes 207–214. 
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1. SPOUSES AND CHILDREN 
The treatment of transfers to spouses and children, particularly 
minor children, is complicated by the fact that transferors may have a 
duty to care for those people.
219
 In this respect, the gift or bequest may 
benefit the transferor at least as much as the transferee. Because of this 
unique situation, some special rules are needed. The basic approach 
should be that transfers actually received outright by somebody within a 
current taxable unit of the transferor
220
 should not be taxable income to 
the recipient. 
The taxable unit of the transferor should be defined to include the 
transferor‘s spouse221 and dependents. With respect to a spouse, other 
scholars have already set forth good reasons for treating them as part of 
the transferor‘s taxable unit, and this Article contributes little to what has 
already been written on the topic.
222
 As Professor Dodge has said, 
―Spouses pool resources, expenses, and decisionmaking.‖223 Other than 
with respect to employee death benefits and life-insurance proceeds, as 
described earlier, the beginning and end of marriage, as well as transfers 
during marriage, should not give rise to taxable income.
224
 Payments 
after divorce should be treated exactly as they are under the current 
Code; that is, alimony payments should be deductible by the payor and 
includable in the payee‘s income.225 
Dependents, such as minor children, present a challenge. It is likely 
that families will try to arrange their affairs so as to avoid inclusion of 
wealth transfers in children‘s income. This risk, however, should be 
weighed against the fact that tax rules should be as administratively 
efficient and simple as possible.
226
 
 
  219. For a summary of state laws dealing with minor-child-support obligations, 
see Ncsl.org, Termination of Child Support and Support Beyond Majority, 
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/cyf/educate.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2008). 
  220. Whether or not the person is in a taxable unit of the transferor should be 
determined at the time of outright receipt by the transferee. In this respect, our system 
should be hard to complete in the sense that transfers in trust or with split interest gifts, 
with the transferor retaining any interest, should not be treated as transfers until they 
come out of trust or the split-interest becomes absolute outright ownership by the 
transferee. 
  221. Although the author personally hopes that spouse will eventually be 
expanded to include a domestic partner, such an addition from the outset is not politically 
wise and would be the death knell of this proposal. 
  222. See, e.g., Dodge, supra note 19, at 1203–05. 
  223. Id. at 1203. 
  224. Id. 
  225. Id. at 1204 (citing I.R.C. §§ 71(a), 215, 682(a)). 
  226. See supra Part II.B.2. 
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It seems that the best way to address the issues of administrative 
efficiency and simplicity is to work toward uniformity. Some 
groundwork is already in place with respect to the concept of what it 
means to be a dependent for income-tax purposes. Specifically, section 
201 of the Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004 revised code section 
152 to create a uniform definition of dependent.
227
 Although it might 
ultimately prove to be unwise to simply adopt the whole definition for 
purposes of determining who is in the taxpayer‘s taxable unit, the 
definition is helpful and, perhaps, could be adopted at least in part. 
The new version of section 152, which is not without its 
problems,
228
 identifies dependent as either a ―qualifying child‖ or a 
―qualifying relative.‖229 Under the definition, the following four criteria 
must be met to be a qualifying child :  1) the qualifying child must be the 
taxpayer‘s biological child, stepchild, adopted child, foster child, brother, 
sister, or a descendant of one of these people;
230
 2) the qualifying child 
must live with the taxpayer for more than six months during the year;
231
 
3) the qualifying child must be either under age nineteen on the last day 
of the year, under age twenty-four on the last day of the year and a full-
time student for at least five months out of the year, or any age and 
totally and permanently disabled;
232
 and 4) the person must not provide 
more than half of her own support during the year.
233
 
Under the new definition of dependent, the following five criteria 
must be met to be a qualifying relative:  1) the qualifying relative must 
earn less than $3,200 in income during the year;
234
 2) the taxpayer must 
provide more than half of the qualifying relative‘s total support during 
the year;
235
 3) the qualifying relative must be related to the taxpayer in 
certain ways or must have the same principal place of abode as the 
taxpayer;
236
 4) the qualifying relative, if married, cannot file a joint 
 
  227. Pub. L. No. 108-311, § 201, 118 Stat. 1166, 1169. 
  228. See Letter from Francis X. Degen, President, National Association of 
Enrolled Agents, to Mark W. Everson, Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service (Feb. 6, 
2006), available at http://www.naea.org/MemberPortal/Advocacy/Comments/ 
Everson_Letter_Feb_2006.htm. 
  229.  I.R.C. § 152(a) (West 2008). 
  230.  Id. § 152(c)(1)(A), (c)(2). 
  231.  Id. § 152(c)(1)(B). 
  232.  Id. § 152(c)(1)(C), (c)(3). 
  233. Id. § 152(c)(1)(D). 
  234.  Id. § 152(d)(1)(B).  
  235.  Id. § 152(d)(1)(C). 
  236. Id. § 152(d)(1)(A). Specifically, she must be the taxpayer‘s child, 
descendant of a child, brother, sister, stepbrother, stepsister, father, mother, ancestor of a 
father or mother, stepfather, stepmother, niece, nephew, uncle, aunt, son-in-law, 
daughter-in-law, father-in-law, mother-in-law, brother-in-law, sister-in-law, or anybody 
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income-tax return with her spouse;
237
 and 5) the qualifying relative must 
be a citizen or resident alien of the United States, Canada, or Mexico.
238
 
It seems politically necessary to include qualified children in the 
taxpayer‘s taxable unit because there would be public outcry if taking 
care of one‘s minor children were to result in taxable income to the 
children. Qualified relatives are more complicated. They would include 
adult, college-aged children who make little money and who live away at 
college year-round. They would also include an aging mother or 
grandmother, for example, who makes little money but receives gifts 
from her adult child. 
The potential for tax-motivated wealth transfers to a qualifying child 
seems relatively low if the exclusion from the child‘s income is only 
available for outright transfers to relatively young children, as described 
later.
239
 Most taxpayers simply are unlikely to make large outright 
transfers to their immature children solely to avoid taxes. The potential 
for tax-motivated transfers to a qualifying relative, including an adult 
child, seems very high. This leaves two options. First, the proposal could 
require that, in order for a dependent to be part of a taxpayer‘s tax unit, 
the dependent must be a qualifying child. Second, the proposal could 
alternatively define a dependent to be part of the taxpayer‘s tax unit if the 
dependent is either a qualifying child or qualifying relative. In either 
case, a support limitation, described shortly, should be added. Thus, the 
dependent would only be in the taxpayer‘s taxable unit to the extent that 
amounts transferred to that dependent do not exceed her support needs. 
In addition, with respect to qualifying relatives, it would be prudent to 
add an annual dollar limit, such as $50,000, on the amount that may be 
excluded from a qualifying relative‘s income. 
Longstanding case law addresses the concept of support of 
dependents in the gift-tax context. Specifically, in Converse v. 
Commissioner,
240
 the IRS Commissioner conceded that the taxpayer‘s 
support of his dependent child was not a gift for gift-tax purposes.
241
 The 
rationale for this rule is that support of a dependent child is not a gift to 
the child because the transfer fulfills the transferor‘s legal obligation to 
support the child; the transfer represents, thus, consumption by the 
transferor rather than a gift to the child.
242
 To determine what constitutes 
 
with the same principal place of abode as the taxpayer. Id. § 152(d)(2). Thus, a 
nonrelated person actually can qualify as a qualifying relative. 
  237.  Id. § 152(b)(2). 
  238. Id. § 152(b)(3)(A). 
  239. See infra Part IV.B.4. 
  240. 5 T.C. 1014 (1945). 
  241. Id. at 1016. 
  242. See Rev. Rul. 68-379, 1968-2 C.B. 414. 
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support, it is necessary to look to state law
243
 and possibly to the 
economic circumstances of the transferor and transferee.
244
 
In the context of this proposal, the purpose of adding a support 
limitation would be to limit the amount that a dependent could exclude 
from income. In the context of a qualifying child, the rule could, for 
example, say that a qualifying child is included in the transferor‘s taxable 
unit for all transfers that do not exceed amounts necessary to support the 
qualifying child in her accustomed standard of living. The support 
obligation applicable to a qualifying relative is different from one 
applicable to a qualifying child because the taxpayer usually does not 
have a legal obligation to support a qualifying relative. This is more akin 
to support limitations commonly found in irrevocable trust agreements. 
This limitation is not tied to any legal duty of the transferor; it solely 
would be added to prevent families from using the qualified-relative 
exception to make large wealth transfers to family members.
245
 As 
mentioned, it also would be wise to include an annual dollar limit on the 
maximum that may be excluded from a qualifying relative‘s income. If 
this proposal were adopted in connection with Professor Graetz‘s 
Competitive Tax Plan, for example, a $50,000 limitation for a single 
recipient would make sense because that is the income exemption under 
his proposal. 
My proposal does not impose a tax when the dependent leaves the 
taxable unit. Although a tax at that time would increase federal revenue, 
it seems unlikely to be well received by the general public. A key 
problem with including dependents in the taxpayer‘s taxable unit, with 
no tax upon departure from the taxable unit, is that it potentially gives the 
taxpayer an incentive to make transfers to family members earlier than 
she otherwise would in order to avoid generating taxable income to the 
recipient. This result is minimized with a support limitation and can be 
minimized further by making it difficult to complete gifts for tax 
purposes, as discussed later.
246
 Doing so would mean that most transfers 
through trusts would not accomplish the transferor‘s tax-avoidance 
objectives. In addition, the possibility of deferral by rolling gifts into an 
IRA is likely to minimize the incentive to make outright transfers. 
 
  243. See WILLBANKS, supra note 15, at 136. 
  244. Id. 
  245. This would include adult children who have low incomes, even if they do 
not live with the transferor. 
  246. See infra Part IV.B.4. 
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2. EDUCATION AND MEDICAL EXPENSES 
Current law provides that payments directly to a medical or 
educational institution to pay medical or educational expenses on behalf 
of another person are not taxable gifts.
247
 This is generally permitted 
because people often provide basic necessities to their adult children and 
other relatives.
248
 It seems that there is no good reason to discontinue this 
kind of encouragement. Thus, this same exclusion should be made to 
apply to income inclusion under this proposal. A wholesale adoption of 
the rule currently contained in section 2503(e) as an exception to income 
inclusion of liquid assets would be the easiest way to do this.
249
 This also 
could expressly allow for an exclusion for payments directly to section 
529 Plans and prepaid tuition plans.
250
 
3. INCOME AVERAGING V. IRA ROLLOVER 
Proposals to include gifts and inheritances in income generally 
either (1) include all receipts in income in full in the year of receipt,
251
 or 
(2) provide for all income to be averaged over some period of time to 
reduce the effect of placing the recipient in a higher tax bracket due to 
bunching a lot of income into one year.
252
 The problem with including all 
receipts in income in full in the year of receipt is that people will 
perceive it as unfair to tax somebody at a much higher rate because she 
receives an inheritance in one year. In addition, the well-advised person 
would save taxes by making wealth transfers over a long period of time 
rather than at death. This is likely to raise complaints about compliance 
costs. 
The problem with income averaging is complexity or, perhaps more 
importantly, its perceived complexity. The basic idea sounds simple 
enough with respect to the inclusion of gifts and bequests in income: take 
the amount of gift or inheritance received and divide that amount by the 
number of years over which the income may be averaged to determine 
the amount that must be included in income each year.
253
 In practice, 
however, there are numerous complicating factors. For example, it is a 
realistic possibility that recipients of gifts and inheritances may spend the 
money or invest in assets that decline in value prior to paying their tax 
 
  247. I.R.C. § 2503(e) (West 2008). 
  248. See WILLBANKS, supra note 15, at 134. 
  249. Agency and judicial interpretations of this rule should also be adopted 
wholesale as well. 
  250. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200602002 (Sept. 6, 2005). 
  251. See Dodge, supra note 19, at 1190 & n.64. 
  252. Id. at 1181 & n.21. 
  253. See id. at 1181 n.21. 
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liability.
254
 As a result, the government will need to attempt to collect 
from people who may no longer be solvent. As Professor Richard 
Schmalbeck has said, 
By its very nature, any averaging device involves multiyear 
accounting in one form or another. This is inevitably 
troublesome in a tax system whose rules are otherwise 
organized on the basis of an annual accounting requirement. 
While the law is quite clear concerning permissible choices as 
to filing status, determination of marital status, and 
applicability of any particular rate structure, all these concepts 
have to be redefined to deal with a multiyear income-averaging 
formula.
255
 
Schmalbeck notes that the complexities involved in prior, now 
repealed, income-averaging attempts
256
 made it highly probable that 
taxpayers would ―make mistakes . . . be intimidated by the averaging 
schedule . . . and have no sense of the significance of each step in the 
process.‖257 He goes on to note that, ―Of course, these facts, together 
with the magical savings of several hundreds of dollars of tax per eligible 
taxpayer, make income averaging a great boon to the tax return 
preparation industry. Indeed, that industry may be the principal 
beneficiary of the averaging provisions.‖258 
Although income averaging limited to gifts and inheritances over a 
short duration is likely to be much simpler than past income-averaging 
efforts,
259
 the general public still will view it as unduly complicated. As 
Professor Neil Buchanan astutely noted with respect to economist 
 
  254. This is a particular problem because the tax liability with income averaging 
is determined up front rather than on a year-to-year basis. 
  255. Schmalbeck, supra note 102, at 529 (citations omitted). 
  256. The Revenue Act of 1964 allowed eligible taxpayers to elect to average 
their income over several years. Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 232, 78 Stat. 19, 105–12 (codified 
as amended at I.R.C. § 1302); see Schmalbeck, supra note 102, at 510. The rules were 
simplified by the Tax Reform Act of 1969. Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 311, 83 Stat. 487, 586–
88 (1969) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 1302); see Schmalbeck, supra note 102, at 
510–11. In the 1981 tax year, more than 6.5 million taxpayers elected to apply income-
averaging, resulting in a tax savings of almost $4 billion dollars. Id. at 511. These 
comprehensive income averaging provisions were repealed in 1986. Tax Reform Act of 
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, Title I, § 141(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2117; see Lily L. Batchelder, 
Taxing the Poor: Income Averaging Reconsidered, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 395, 420 
(2003). 
  257. Schmalbeck, supra note 102, at 532. 
  258. Id. 
  259. As Batchelder notes with respect to her Targeted Averaging proposal, ―[A] 
short time period is simpler because it requires fewer calculations and records of income 
from past years.‖ Batchelder, supra note 256, at 423. 
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William Vickrey‘s260 famous ―cumulative lifetime averaging‖ of income 
proposal, ―[S]implicity is probably best understood—at least in the 
context of tax reform—not in the mathematical or analytical sense but in 
the on-the-street sense that a simple tax system is one that is easy to 
understand, easy to administer, and easy to obey.‖261 Even strong 
advocates of income averaging accept that it requires some amount of 
record keeping on the part of taxpayers.
262
 Regardless of the actual 
simplicity of the system, the public is likely to perceive income 
averaging as extremely complicated.
263
 In today‘s political climate, this 
perception can effectively foreclose any possibility of passing reforms 
that include income averaging. Although income averaging in some 
situations may be justified if there is a strong public-policy reason for 
doing so and if there is no better option,
264
 this must be approached with 
care. With respect to gifts and inheritances, there is a much better 
option—the IRA rollover. 
Under current law, each individual may transfer $5,000 into a 
deductible IRA each year if the individual is not a participant in an 
employer-sponsored retirement plan or if the individual is a participant in 
such a plan but has an adjusted gross income of less than $52,000.
265
 An 
 
  260. William Vickrey was a well-known economist who won, with James 
Mirlees, the 1996 Nobel Prize in Economics (technically called the ―Bank of Sweden 
Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel‖). Press Release, Royal Swedish 
Acad. of Sci., The Sweriges Riksbank (Bank of Sweden) Prize in Economic Sciences in 
Memory of Alfred Nobel for 1996 (Oct. 8, 1996), available at 
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1996/press.html. 
  261. Neil H. Buchanan, The Case Against Income Averaging, 25 VA. TAX REV. 
1151, 1207 (2006).  
  262. William Vickrey, Averaging of Income for Income-Tax Purposes, 47 J. POL. 
ECON. 379, 394 (1939). 
  263. See Buchanan, supra note 261, at 1207. 
  264. Batchelder provides a good example of a situation in which a form of 
income averaging may be warranted. See generally Batchelder, supra note 256 (arguing 
that poorer people generally would pay lower taxes if they could use her proposed form 
of income averaging). 
  265. I.R.C. § 219(b) (West 2008). The $5,000 amount is increased for 
individuals age fifty or older or who participated in the 401(k) plan of a bankrupt 
employer. Id. § 219(b)(5)(B)–(C). These provisions were added by the Pension Protection 
Act of 2006. Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 831(a), 120 Stat. 780, 1002. For individuals who 
participate in employer-sponsored retirement plans, the $5,000 contribution limit phases 
out over an income range of $52,000 to $62,000. I.R.C. § 219(g)(8); Rev. Proc. 2006-53, 
2006-48 I.R.B. 996. This provision was also added by the Pension Protection Act of 
2006. § 833(b), 120 Stat at 1003. Spouses, who are not participants in employer-
sponsored retirement plans, may each make contributions to his or her own IRA up to the 
annual individual contribution limit (i.e., $5,000). I.R.C. § 219(c). For spouses, who are 
both participants in employer-sponsored retirement plans, the annual contribution limits 
are reduced to zero over a modified adjusted gross income between $83,000–103,000. Id. 
§ 219(g)(8). This provision was added by the Pension Protection Act of 2006. Pub. L. No. 
109-280, § 833(b), 120 Stat at 1003; Rev. Proc. 2006-53. Numerous special rules, all 
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individual who establishes such an IRA generally cannot take 
distributions before age fifty-nine-and-a-half,
266
 and must begin taking 
required minimum distributions (RMDs) out of the IRA beginning no 
later than April 1 after the calendar year in which the owner turns age 
seventy-and-a-half.
267
 The amount of these distributions generally is 
computed to pay out over the individual‘s life expectancy.268 Assuming 
that the individual only made deductible contributions to the IRA, then 
distributions from it are fully taxable as ordinary income to the 
individual or the beneficiary.
269
 
If the individual dies before the IRA balance has been completely 
distributed, the remaining funds get paid to the individual‘s 
beneficiary.
270
 If that person is the deceased individual‘s spouse, she may 
take a full nontaxable distribution if she rolls the funds into her own IRA 
or she may elect to treat the inherited IRA as her own; either way, she 
will compute the payout based on her own life expectancy and, in many 
cases, may defer taking RMDs until she turns age seventy-and-a-half.
271
 
If the designated beneficiary is anybody other than a spouse, no rollover 
is allowed, payment must begin (or continue) immediately, and the 
payout generally can be spread out over the beneficiary‘s own life 
expectancy.
272
 As mentioned, all payouts from the IRA after the 
individual‘s death that are IRD (i.e., all payouts other than those resulting 
 
beyond the scope of this Article, apply to determine contribution limits. See generally 
I.R.C. § 219. 
  266. I.R.C. § 72(t)(2)(A). In general, distributions before age fifty-and-one-half 
will be subject to a 10 percent penalty tax on top of the ordinary income tax that is owed, 
subject to certain exceptions (with respect only to the 10 percent penalty) if the 
distribution (1) is upon the death or disability of the participant, (2) is pursuant to a 
qualified domestic relations order, (3) does not exceed deductible medical expenses, (4) 
is made as a result of an IRS levy on the account, (5) is a ―qualified hurricane 
distribution,‖ (6) is a ―qualified reservist distribution,‖ (7) is used to pay medical-
insurance premiums if the beneficiary is unemployed, (8) is used to pay ―qualified higher 
education expenses,‖ (9) is used to pay ―first time homebuyer expenses,‖ or (10) is a 
return of a nondeductible IRA contribution. I.R.C. § 72(t). 
  267. Treas. Reg. § 1.408-8, Q&A (3) (2008). 
  268. See generally I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(9)(A), 408(a)(6), 408(b)(3). The 
computation of payout periods from a deductible IRA is beyond the scope of this Article. 
  269. Id. § 691. The rule is more complex if the individual has made any 
nondeductible contributions to the IRA, in which case distributions are handled like 
annuity payments. See generally id. §§ 72, 408(d)(1). 
  270. See id. §§ 401(a)(9)(A), 408(a)(6). 
  271. See Treas. Reg. 1.408-8, Q&A (5)(a) (2004). 
  272. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.408-8. The details of these payout rules are 
beyond the scope of this Article. However, it is worth noting that, in certain 
circumstances, a five-year payout will be required. See generally I.R.C. § 401(a)(9); 
Treas. Reg. § 1.408-8. 
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from nondeductible contributions) are taxable as ordinary income to the 
recipient.
273
 
Under my proposal, sections 101 and 102 would be modified so that 
recipients, other than somebody in the transferor‘s taxable unit,274 
include all gifts and bequests of cash or cash equivalents in income in the 
year of receipt
275
 with one key special rule: recipients would be allowed 
to roll an unlimited portion of any gift or bequest, other than IRD, into a 
deductible IRA by April 15 of the year following the year of receipt. 
Thus, the recipient could deduct the amount rolled into the IRA from her 
income for the year. IRD is treated differently because it never was 
included in the transferor‘s income, and the purpose of this proposal is 
not to allow unlimited deferral of taxes except where necessary to 
prevent a forced sale. To allow for this policy to work, the IRA 
contribution limit
276
 should be increased for each individual by the 
amount of gift or inheritance that she receives that year, less any portion 
of the gift or inheritance that is IRD. This would prevent families from 
using IRAs to make repeated intergenerational gifts and avoiding taxes 
eternally. The basic idea is that the IRA rules for members of the 
taxpayer‘s taxable unit, such as a spouse, should not change from the 
current rules at all. Non-IRD that the spouse or minor child receives is 
not taxable income to that person. IRD, which has never been taxed to 
the transferor, is taxable income to the beneficiary, just as it is under 
current law. 
With respect to anybody outside the taxpayer‘s taxable unit, who 
would generally be taxed on a gift or inheritance of liquid assets, the 
recipient should have the option of rolling that gift or inheritance, or any 
portion of it, into a deductible IRA, provided that the inheritance is not 
IRD. This approach allows people who inherit liquid assets to defer taxes 
somewhat like recipients of illiquid assets, and it also will encourage 
donees and heirs to save in a simple, established manner and in a way 
 
  273.  I.R.C. § 691. 
  274. See supra Part IV.B.1. This would include spouses and dependants. 
Dependants would include qualifying children and qualifying relatives, provided that the 
amount transferred to the dependant does not exceed her support needs. In addition, 
qualified relatives would not be in the taxpayer‘s taxable unit to the extent that the 
transfer exceeds a dollar limitation, such as $50,000. 
  275. As Professor Dodge has persuasively argued, life insurance proceeds, 
deferred-compensation-plan proceeds, and employee death benefits should be treated as 
income to the recipient except to the extent that the recipient, or a person in the same tax 
unit as the recipient, has paid insurance premiums or made plan contributions out of 
amounts previously taxed to the recipient, or to a person in the same taxable unit as the 
recipient. Dodge, supra note 19, at 1200–02. 
  276. I.R.C. § 219(b)(1). 
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that will ultimately result in full taxation of the gift or inheritance. If they 
prefer to not contribute to an IRA, they pay the tax immediately.
277
 
IRD cannot be rolled into an IRA because it was never taxed to the 
decedent. This special rule would prevent liquid assets from being rolled 
forward indefinitely without taxation. The whole proposal merely allows 
an individual to defer taxes for her lifetime, but not forever. This is 
admittedly in contrast to the ability to defer taxes on illiquid assets 
forever, but that distinction is necessary to prevent a forced sale or loan 
to pay taxes. 
4. THE TRUST PROBLEM 
Trusts and other ways in which transferors can retain control over 
gifts create unique issues with respect to income inclusion of gifts of 
cash or cash equivalents. This proposal treats dependents as part of the 
transferor‘s taxable unit. Because of this, transferors have a tax incentive 
to make gifts to their children while they are still dependents. This 
incentive is counterbalanced by the fact that, in my years of estate 
planning experience, most parents hesitate to make outright gifts to their 
dependent children out of concern that the children will squander their 
inheritances. This issue is removed if the parent can make the gift in a 
way in which the parent retains control over the gift, such as a trust or a 
custodianship. This proposal deals with all these transfers in the same 
general way. 
This problem can be remedied by adopting a hard-to-complete gift 
rule similar to that advocated by Professor Dodge with respect to 
reforming our current estate- and gift-tax system.
278
 The details of such a 
rule are beyond the scope of this Article; however, the basic idea of how 
it would apply to this proposal is simple enough. In general, the grantor-
trust rules of sections 671–78 of the Code should be expanded so that 
virtually any retained control or interest by a living transferor would 
result in our income-tax law treating the arrangement as if no transfer 
had been made for income-tax purposes. The basic idea is that tax law 
must look to the moment of actual, outright receipt by a living 
beneficiary when determining if a gift or inheritance is included in the 
transferee‘s income. The concept of outright receipt should be extremely 
limited, and it should not be expanded to include general powers of 
appointment. If outright receipt does not occur until a time when the 
recipient is no longer the transferor‘s dependent, then the asset, at its 
actual value at the time of outright transfer, will be fully includable in the 
 
  277. More specifically, they would pay the tax by April 15 of the year following 
the year of receipt. 
  278. See Dodge, supra note 124, at 308–09. 
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recipient‘s income. Before such time, the assets shall be treated for 
income-tax purposes as if still fully owned by the transferor. 
Testamentary transfers, transfers without any sort of retained control 
that would cause the transferor to continue to be treated as the owner for 
income-tax purposes, and transfers that occur upon termination of 
retained control are more difficult. The challenge lies in determining how 
to tax the transfer of trust corpus, as well as income earned with respect 
to the transferred assets, after they have left the transferor‘s control but 
before they have been received outright by the ultimate transferee. One 
possibility is to allow tax deferral until ultimate distribution. This is the 
approach originally suggested by Dodge, other than with respect to large 
trusts.
279
 Specifically, he suggested several years ago that deferral 
generally, other than with respect to large trusts, will not result in much 
revenue loss, particularly given that the rule against perpetuities 
commonly limits the duration of these trusts, resulting in taxation of the 
full distribution upon termination of trusts.
280
 This situation has changed 
somewhat since he suggested this because states have since begun to 
repeal or expand their rules against perpetuities.
281
 With respect to large 
trusts, he suggested that a simple withholding tax may be appropriate.
282
 
To keep everything simple, my proposal treats testamentary 
transfers, transfers without any sort of retained control, and transfers that 
occur upon termination of retained control, as fully taxable to the 
recipient trust if it has any noncharitable beneficiaries (including 
contingent beneficiaries) and if the transferred item is a liquid asset.
283
 
Receipt of liquid assets by a fully charitable trust would be tax exempt. 
Receipt of illiquid assets would not be taxable, but basis would be 
stepped down to zero, as described later. The trust would then be treated 
as a separate taxpayer, fully taxable at trust income-tax rates as under 
current law. When an outright distribution is ultimately made to a living, 
breathing beneficiary, that beneficiary should be taxed on the full amount 
 
  279. Dodge, supra note 19, at 1196–97. 
  280. Id. at 1195–96. 
  281. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-1-23 (2008) (repealing South Dakota‘s 
Rule Against Perpetuities); ALASKA STAT. § 34.27.051 (2007) (expanding Alaska‘s Rule 
Against Perpetuities to 1000 years). 
  282. Dodge, supra note 19, at 1197. Professor Dodge has changed his mind since 
he wrote this. See Dodge, supra note 124, at 308–09. See also TAXATION OF WEALTH 
TRANSFERS WITHIN A FAMILY, supra note 104, at 33–36. 
  283. A similar rule should apply to custodians and guardians. This proposal is 
similar to Professor Batchelder‘s proposal with respect to trusts except that her proposal 
treats trusts with one noncharitable beneficiary differently from trusts with multiple 
noncharitable beneficiaries. See Batchelder, supra note 20, at 24. This proposal would 
treat them the same. 
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received but allowed a credit equal to the amount of taxes paid that are 
allocable to property distributed to that beneficiary.
284
 
5. A CRUMMEY PROBLEM 
In order to avoid having every small gift, such as birthday and 
Christmas gifts, treated as taxable, Congress enacted the gift-tax annual 
exclusion of section 2503(b). This annual exclusion, which is adjusted 
for inflation, currently removes all present-interest gifts of $12,000 or 
less per year, per donee from the present gift-tax regime.
285
 This rule, 
more than anything else under current law, encourages wealthy 
individuals to disperse their wealth among many beneficiaries, which is 
good. The problem, as any estate planner knows, is that wealthy families 
use this rule for tax-planning purposes, and they commonly give the 
maximum amount that they can each year and then continue to give 
birthday, Christmas, and other gifts that are often quite extravagant. This 
problem was greatly exacerbated with the case of Crummey v. 
Commissioner.
286
 
In Crummey, the court held that gifts to trusts count as present-
interest gifts if the beneficiary has an immediate right to withdraw the 
funds from the trust, even for a limited duration.
287
 This rule has made 
annual-exclusion gifts to trusts for minor beneficiaries a core component 
of estate planning for wealthy families. A rule such as this cannot, and 
need not, be extended to this proposal. 
My proposal solves the problem completely with respect to gifts 
from parents to their dependent children. These transfers generally would 
not result in taxable income to the dependent. With respect to gifts to 
nondependents, say from a grandparent to a grandchild, it gets trickier. If 
these gifts are not cash or cash equivalents, then they will not be taxable 
to the recipient until, and if, they are sold, as discussed later.
288
 If, 
however, these gifts are cash or cash equivalents, they will be taxable to 
the recipient or, if the recipient is a dependent child, to her parent, 
subject of course to the possibility of rolling the gift into an IRA. To 
prevent this from happening with respect to small gifts, the proposal 
 
  284. A similar approach, albeit utilizing withholding by the grantor or his estate 
rather than tax payments by the trustee, is advocated by Professor Batchelder with respect 
to trusts with multiple beneficiaries. Id. The main difficulty with this approach lies in 
devising a system to fairly allocate the credit. 
  285. I.R.S. § 2503(b) (West 2008); Rev. Proc. 2001-59.19(1), 2001-2 C.B. 623. 
Thus, these gifts do not utilize any of the donor‘s lifetime gift-tax exemption amount and 
they do not require the filing of gift-tax returns. 
  286. 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968). 
  287. Id. at 88.  
  288. See infra Part IV.C. 
PAREJA – FINAL 1/28/2009 3:06 PM 
2008:841 Taxation Without Liquidation 889 
would allow for a very small de minimus exception. Specifically, an 
outright gift of $600 or less in cash or cash equivalents per year, per 
donor should not be includable in the recipient‘s income.289 This rule 
specifically should not allow any exception for gifts to trusts, thus 
avoiding the Crummey problem. Grandparents could make small cash 
gifts to their grandkids, or unlimited noncash gifts, without any income-
tax implications. Larger gifts would be taxable to the recipient, or the 
recipient‘s parents, unless they choose to roll the gift into an IRA. In 
addition, payments directly to medical and educational institutions for 
medical expenses and tuition would not be taxable to the recipient 
regardless of the size of the payment. 
C. Anything Other than Cash or Cash Equivalents 
Most wealth-transfer-tax-reform proposals allow special carve-outs 
for family farms and businesses.
290
 This approach treats people who are 
not in farming or business families unfairly. In addition, these rules are 
extremely complex.
291
 There is a much simpler approach available that 
would prevent every single recipient of illiquid assets from having to sell 
the asset to pay taxes. 
1. STEPPED-DOWN-TO-ZERO BASIS 
As mentioned, current law provides that lifetime gifts receive a 
carryover basis
292
 and assets transferred at death receive a basis equal to 
the asset‘s market value on the transferor‘s date of death.293 The 
unlimited step-up in basis is repealed during the one year (2010) that the 
 
  289. This amount matches the Form 1099 reporting requirement. See INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERV., 2008 INSTRUCTIONS FOR 1099-MISC 5, available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1099msc.pdf. Specifically, transferors of nonemployee 
compensation of $600 or more per year currently are required to report the transfer to the 
IRS and provide the recipient with a Form 1099-MISC showing the amount that has been 
reported. Id. This reporting requirement currently does not apply to gifts. Id. The de 
minimus exception of this proposal would expand the applicability of this reporting 
requirement to include gifts. In short, the amount to be excluded from income under the 
de minimus exception should be tied directly to the Form 1099-MISC reporting 
requirement. Thus, the $600 amount would be increased in the future if and when the 
Form 1099-MISC reporting requirement increases. 
  290. See Dodge, supra note 19, at 1200 n.114 (noting that a special exception 
may be necessary for family farms and businesses). Professor Dodge leaves open the 
possibility of extending a special rule to personal residences as well. Id. 
  291. See I.R.C. §§ 2032A, 2057, 6166 (West 2008). 
  292. Supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
  293. Supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
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estate tax is repealed.
294
 Instead of an unlimited step-up at death, for 
decedents dying during that one year, assets passing from the decedent to 
any person other than the decedent‘s spouse will receive a step-up of up 
to $1.3 million; assets passing to the decedent‘s spouse will receive a 
step-up of up to $3 million.
295
 Neither the carryover nor the step-up 
approach makes sense. 
The biggest problem with a carryover basis, particularly with 
respect to transfers at death, is that it is extremely burdensome to track 
basis on property acquired by another person, potentially generations 
ago. The biggest problem with a stepped-up basis at death is that it 
creates what is commonly called the ―lock-in effect;‖ that is, people hold 
on to assets until death because they know that all the tax on the gain will 
be forgiven.
296
 The solution to these problems is a stepped-down-to-zero 
basis that would apply to either gifts or transfers at death. 
The stepped-down-to-zero basis would apply to all transfers of 
illiquid assets to people outside the transferor‘s taxable unit, if the 
recipient does not include the value of the asset in her income in the year 
of receipt. Thus, a gift at death or during life, of a primary residence, 
investment real estate, an heirloom, a piano, furniture, or a 
grandmother‘s wedding ring would not result in any immediate income 
tax to the recipient unless the recipient elects to include it in income, and 
the recipient would take that asset with an income-tax basis of zero.
297
 If 
the asset is never sold, even for generations, it will never be taxed. If the 
recipient includes the value in income, then the amount included in 
income would be the recipient‘s income-tax basis in the asset, and future 
gain in an appreciating asset generally would be capital gain. The 
purpose of this rule is merely to get at the recipient‘s true ability to pay 
without borrowing or selling assets. The goal is to stop the tax-motivated 
 
  294. I.R.C. §§ 1014(f), 2210. Although this is not necessarily the case, if estate- 
and gift-tax repeal under EGTRRA is made permanent, the repeal of the unlimited step-
up (and step-down) in basis is also likely to become permanent. 
  295. I.R.C. § 1022. 
  296.  See POPKIN, supra note 8, at 497. 
  297. This also means that an asset that ordinarily would be eligible for 
depreciation will no longer be depreciable because it will have a basis of zero. The basis 
technically should be stepped down to the greater of (1) zero, or (2) the amount of debt 
assumed by the transferee in connection with the transferred asset. This special rule is 
necessary to prevent an heir from having to recognize an artificially high gain upon sale. 
For example, assume a person in the 35 percent income-tax bracket inherits a home, and 
nothing more, worth $200,000 and subject to a $180,000 mortgage. If the person takes 
the home with a zero basis and sells it a year later for $200,000, she will have $200,000 
of ordinary income, resulting in a tax of $70,000 (i.e., 35 percent of $200,000). This tax 
is three-and-a-half times the true value of the inheritance she received. Instead, she 
should take the property with a $180,000 basis (i.e., the amount of debt to which the 
property is subject). She would then only have $20,000 of gain upon sale, and a tax of 
$7,000 (i.e., 35 percent of $20,000). 
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sale of assets in connection with gifts. The concept also makes intuitive 
sense because the recipient personally has invested nothing in the asset. 
2. TAXING GAIN UPON SALE 
When any asset received by gift or inheritance and not included in 
the recipient‘s income is subsequently sold by the recipient or any 
successor transferee, she will report all gain as ordinary income at that 
time.
298
 Another approach would be to treat all gain up to the value on 
the date of transfer to the recipient as ordinary income with any 
additional gain as capital gain. This approach is problematic for two 
reasons. First, it is complex. As should be apparent by now, a 
fundamental goal of this proposal is to avoid complexity. Second, it is 
unfair to recipients of liquid assets who choose to roll those assets into an 
IRA because everything that comes out of an IRA is taxable as ordinary 
income.
299
 
This potential for multigenerational deferral of taxes on illiquid 
assets is not entirely equitable to recipients of liquid assets, who may 
only defer taxes for the maximum time allowed under the current IRA 
rules, but I believe it is necessary. There are two possible ways to 
remove the inequity to recipients of liquid assets, but neither is 
appealing. First, we could allow for unlimited intergenerational rollovers 
of IRA assets. This would effectively convert this proposal into a 
consumption tax. The problem with doing that is that it would bring us 
back to the problems of the early 1890s; that is, the wealthy could easily 
avoid taxation of all capital appreciation forever. Second, we could 
impose a tax on the value of the illiquid asset at the earlier of the date of 
sale or the date of the recipient‘s death. The problem with this approach 
is that it will create the same liquidity problems we have under our 
 
  298. A significant additional difference between this proposal and a 
consumption-tax approach is that, with a consumption-tax approach, ―[d]eferral treatment 
cannot be conferred upon personal assets which represent ongoing consumption.‖ Dodge, 
supra note 19, at 1199. As Professor Dodge correctly notes, ―Deferral for personal assets 
that are used up through consumption would amount to tax forgiveness.‖ Id. at 1119 
n.113. This is completely correct and a valid concern, but, in the interest of simplicity, 
this proposal does not make any distinction between personal assets and business or 
investment assets. Although this approach will result in reduced federal revenue, it should 
not result in significant tax evasion. It seems very unlikely that a transferor would invest 
a significant amount in wasting personal assets for the sole purpose of having her heirs 
avoid taxes, especially given that the deferral option is available. People despise tax 
complexity. In fact, the survival of particular taxes, such as wealth-transfer taxes, may be 
dependent on their being extremely simple. It is easy to imagine the complexity that 
would result if, for example, a person dies owning assets that are part investment and part 
personal-use assets. 
  299. See supra Part IV.B.3. 
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current wealth-transfer-tax system; that is, people will be forced to sell 
assets or borrow to pay taxes. Thus, in the face of these two difficulties, 
this proposal allows a degree of inequity, as well as revenue loss, by 
giving the recipient of illiquid assets the option of deferring taxes until 
actual sale of the asset. To minimize the impact of this special rule and to 
prevent this from becoming a consumption tax with respect to illiquid 
assets only, deferral cannot be extended beyond actual sale by 
reinvesting the proceeds in like-kind property.
300
 
3. TAX-FREE EXCHANGES 
Several Code sections expressly allow for nonrecognition of 
realized gains.
301
 The usual policy reason given for these deferral 
provisions is because we do not want to discourage the taxpayer from 
moving money from one investment to a more economically prudent 
similar investment.
302
 In the case of my proposal, that policy reason is 
outweighed by principles of equity. More specifically, the initial deferral 
of gain on receipt of an inheritance is allowed for one reason only—
because the taxpayer should not be forced to sell the asset (or borrow 
against it) to pay taxes. If, however, the sale occurs independently of a 
need to pay taxes, the taxpayer should be forced to pay up what is owed. 
In short, liquidity has ceased to be an issue. 
An argument could be made that this rule would create a lock-in 
effect because taxpayers will have to pay taxes if they sell the asset. This 
problem, however, will be reduced significantly from its current state 
with repeal of the stepped-up basis at death.
303
 In fact, the stepped-down-
to-zero basis at death may reverse the lock-in effect for assets with any 
income-tax basis, say from additional capital contributions, because 
holding on to assets until death would then result in more tax than selling 
and paying an immediate tax.
304
 
Personal residences do not generally qualify for tax-free exchange 
treatment because they are personal-use assets rather than assets held for 
 
  300. This additional deferral is generally allowed under rules such as section 
1031. See I.R.C. § 1031(a) (allowing a deferral for trade or business or investment 
property other than inventory, stock, bonds, and similar assets). Unlimited deferral of 
taxes through reinvestment of the proceeds upon sale would be a consumption-tax 
approach. This proposal rejects that approach and, instead, focuses on the liquidity issue. 
  301. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 351(a), 1031(a), 1032(a), 1033(A), 1035(a), 1036(a), 
1037(a), 1041(a), 1042(a), 1043(a). 
  302. See POPKIN, supra note 8, at 497. 
  303. See Dodge, supra note 21, at 442. 
  304. This would occur because tax basis would be lost if the asset is held on to 
until death. 
PAREJA – FINAL 1/28/2009 3:06 PM 
2008:841 Taxation Without Liquidation 893 
investment.
305
 Instead, the first $250,000 of gain ($500,000 for a married 
couple filing jointly) on the sale of a primary residence is exempt from 
income tax.
306
 Because this is a targeted tax exemption that requires the 
taxpayer to live in the home two out of the five years prior to sale, it 
seems that this rule should apply to residences received by gift or 
inheritance, provided that the recipient meets the two-out-of-five-year 
requirement. A contrary rule would compel people who inherit the 
family home to sell the home immediately upon receipt and to invest the 
proceeds in a new residence, which would make it possible for that 
beneficiary to receive tax-free gain on the new property once it 
appreciates in value. 
4. UNTAXED GAINS AT DEATH 
One difference between this proposal and others is that this 
approach technically fails to tax the gain that was built into property 
owned by the decedent at her death.
307
 Suppose, for example, that Elderly 
Woman owns a piece of real estate worth $200,000 with a $100,000 
income-tax basis. If she sells the property before death, she will owe 
$15,000 of capital-gain tax, and her son will inherit $185,000 in cash, 
which he may roll into an IRA. Assuming he does not roll it into an IRA, 
he will owe taxes on an additional $185,000 of ordinary income. 
Assuming he is in the 35 percent bracket, his federal tax liability
308
 will 
be $64,750, and he will be left with $120,250 free and clear. 
If, on the other hand, Elderly Woman holds on to the property until 
death, her son will inherit property worth $200,000 with an income-tax 
basis of zero. If he sells the property immediately, he will have $200,000 
of ordinary income under my proposal. This will result in a $70,000 tax 
liability for him, and he will be left with $130,000 free and clear. The 
different result is due to the fact that this proposal does not treat Elderly 
Woman as if she had sold the property unless she actually sells it. 
A possible approach to taxing gifts and inheritances would be to 
treat property owned by a decedent as if it were sold at her death (i.e., 
deemed realization in addition to income inclusion by the recipient), 
resulting in immediate capital-gain liability to the estate. This approach, 
when combined with income inclusion to the recipient, would result in 
 
  305. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. 544, SALES AND OTHER DISPOSITIONS 
OF ASSETS 11 (2007), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p544.pdf; Rev. Proc. 
2005-14, 2005-1 C.B. 528. 
  306. I.R.C. § 121. 
  307. For a proposal that taxes the built-in gain to the estate or transferor as well 
as the receipt of gifts and inheritances as income to the beneficiary, see Kornhauser, 
supra note 19, at 54. 
  308. For simplicity, assume that he lives in a state without a state income tax. 
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the beneficiary ending up with $120,250 whether or not Elderly Woman 
sold the property. This is a more equitable and technically correct 
approach. In the interest of keeping the system simple and avoiding 
forced sales or loans, however, this proposal foregoes the tax revenue 
that might be gained from this approach. 
5. POTENTIAL FOR TAX AVOIDANCE 
The biggest problem with this proposal is that it creates an incentive 
to convert liquid assets to illiquid assets because illiquid assets allow for 
the deferral of taxes over multiple generations
309
 while liquid assets only 
allow deferral over one generation. Because of this, astute planners are 
likely to suggest that clients put cash and publicly traded stock inside a 
closely-held-business entity (an illiquid asset) in an effort to permanently 
defer taxes. To prevent this, the proposal must include an antiavoidance 
rule that would treat cash and publicly traded securities held within a 
closely-held-business entity, beyond the reasonable business needs of 
that entity, as liquid assets. Although this goes against the proposal‘s 
focus on simplicity, it is necessary to prevent people from evading taxes. 
Of course, at an even more basic level, it could be argued that this 
proposal will distort taxpayers‘ behavior by giving them an incentive to 
sell liquid assets and reinvest the proceeds in illiquid assets, such as real 
estate, farms, and closely held businesses.
310
 Although this may be true, 
virtually all tax laws have some degree of incentive effects. For example, 
special rules applicable to family farms and small business under our 
current estate-tax law encourage taxpayers to invest in those assets.
311
 In 
addition, the stepped-up basis at death encourages elderly people to hold 
on to assets that they might otherwise choose to sell. With respect to this 
proposal, the incentive effect does not seem very significant, at least with 
respect to appreciating assets, because the only benefit of investing in 
those illiquid assets is to defer taxes over various generations rather than 
over the owner‘s child‘s lifetime, as would be possible with a rollover 
into an IRA. It seems unlikely that a significant number of people would 
choose to invest in illiquid assets rather than liquid assets, which provide 
 
  309. This assumes that some future recipient of an illiquid asset will eventually 
sell it. This is a reasonable assumption because the usual exponential growth in the size 
of a family over time will likely cause there to be an increase in the number of owners of 
an asset over generations. Because these owners will have different cash needs and 
desires, somebody in a family is likely to eventually choose to sell the asset. 
  310. They initially may also choose to invest in illiquid assets rather than liquid 
assets. This Article does not consider whether investments in illiquid assets are more 
beneficial to society that investments in liquid assets. 
  311. See TAXATION OF WEALTH TRANSFERS WITHIN A FAMILY, supra note 104, at 
3. 
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much greater flexibility, solely to defer taxes over more than one 
generation. 
The incentive to invest in illiquid assets is arguably exacerbated 
with respect to personal-use illiquid assets. As mentioned, these assets 
will tend to decline in value as they are consumed.
312
 This, of course, 
effectively will result in tax forgiveness, rather than deferral, for those 
assets.
313
 Despite this tax-avoidance potential, it seems even less likely 
that individuals would invest in significant amounts of wasting personal-
use assets to avoid taxes. Although a small amount of this may occur, 
such as giving an automobile to a child, it will not create widespread tax 
avoidance. In addition, to the small extent that this does occur, I believe 
that the benefits of having a simple system outweigh the potential 
revenue loss. Said differently, it will greatly simplify our transfer-tax 
system if taxpayers do not need to distinguish between personal-use 
illiquid assets and business- or investment-use assets; the benefits of this 
simplicity greatly outweigh the relatively small potential revenue loss. 
CONCLUSION 
I have, for many years, been a strong advocate of our transfer-tax 
system because I strongly believe in the goals that underlie it. 
Specifically, I believe that our society is stronger if each individual‘s 
wealth and income is more closely tied to her personal achievements 
than to the family into which she was born. Although it is impossible to 
remove all privilege at birth and although income frequently bears little 
correlation to personal achievements, it is a worthy goal to try to level 
the playing field. 
For many years, I believed that an estate tax focused on the wealthy 
did a relatively good job of reducing this birth privilege. Recently, 
however, I have begun to question this for several reasons. First, I saw 
the very wealthy find ways to avoid or greatly reduce transfer taxes. 
Second, I saw the anti-estate-tax movement gain widespread popular 
support to the point at which the system‘s continued existence has been 
called into question. Third, I saw estate-tax-exemption amounts increase 
to levels at which huge amounts of financial advantage can be transferred 
between generations with no tax whatsoever. Thus, with very basic 
planning, a married couple will be able to pass $7 million tax free to their 
child in 2009. A child born into a working-class family, on the other 
hand, will need to pay state and local income taxes as well as social-
security taxes on what little she might earn in wages. Realistically, she 
will have no chance to compete with the $7 million child. That rich child 
 
  312. Supra note 196. 
  313. See Dodge, supra note 19, at 1199. 
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will be able to pay millions of dollars in cash for a house and will have 
plenty left to live extremely well, while the working-class girl may not 
be able to save up enough to buy a house. The rich child also will be able 
to pay private school tuition, attend schools that open doors of 
opportunity, and purchase political influence or political favors. This 
kind of wealth disparity is a threat to a stable society. 
Because of these observations, I have come to the conclusion that 
we need to re-examine our wealth-transfer-tax system. Specifically, we 
should find a new system that will not create popular support for 
abolishing all wealth-transfer taxes. This popular support for repeal will 
exist as long as there is a widespread belief that people need to sell 
assets, especially farms and family businesses, to pay taxes. More 
specifically, our current system should be replaced with a system that is 
transferee-focused. That will encourage wealth dispersion as well as 
reduced tax-planning opportunities. This transferee-focused system 
should aim to treat everybody equally, regardless whether they inherit a 
family farm or family artwork, and it should be designed so that nobody 
will need to sell illiquid assets or borrow against those assets to pay 
taxes. My proposal does just that. 
Although no transfer-tax proposal will ever be perfect, this proposal 
is a step in the right direction. It is simple and it would be easy to 
administer. It taxes heirs more like wage earners, which is much more 
equitable than our current system. It is impossible to predict the revenue 
impact of this proposal because that will depend in large part on whether 
taxpayers choose to roll gifts and inheritances into IRAs, whether they 
choose to include illiquid assets in income, and when they ultimately sell 
those illiquid assets. That being said, it seems likely that tax deferral 
through IRA rollovers will increase federal revenue as people retire and 
begin to withdraw inheritances from IRAs. As an added benefit, this 
resulting increase in tax revenue is likely to come at a time when our 
social-security system will be feeling its greatest financial strain. 
